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From our analysis of the 260 plus tsar appointments made since 1997, we have 
reached 11 principal conclusions: 
1.   Tsars have become a major source of external expertise that Whitehall 
ministers draw upon. Their influence has grown progressively more 
significant over the last 15 years. Our research reveals for the first time 
the scale and scope of their work. Tsars, along with ministers, officials and 
special advisers, are firmly part of the architecture of Whitehall policy 
making. 
2.   The role and achievements of tsars remain largely unrecognised. This is at 
odds with the Coalition government’s stated commitment to ‘open policy 
making.’ 
3.   Tsars are only one source of external expertise available to ministers. 
Others include special advisers, expert committees, consultants and 
researchers, public inquiries, consultations and informal exchanges. 
Appointing tsars can provide advantages over some of these, which are 
attractive to ministers: handpicking the expert, trust, authoritative advice, 
speed of turnaround, low cost, a direct relationship. 
4.   Tsars are public appointments made by ministers. Yet their appointment is 
not presently overseen by either the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments or the Cabinet Office; both seem to regard tsars as too 
trivial for such regulation. Nor do departments have a central record of 
tsars or offer any guidance on making tsar appointments or working with 
tsars. This latter is not the case with most of the other sources of external 
expertise. 
5.   Ministers have sometimes used tsar appointments for more overtly 
political reasons: in inter-departmental battles, or when attempting to 
forge cross-party consensus, to enhance public relations, or as political 
patronage. 
6.   Ministers know of or about individual tsars before appointment. Tsars are 
drawn from a relatively narrow circle, mostly from business and public 
service. They are not at all diverse. 
7.   Tsars’ expertise varies: some are specialists in the field in which they 
advise, others are generalists relying on their managerial experience and 
knowledge to bring an ‘open mind’ to the topic; others are already known 
advocates for a particular course of action. 
8.   Ministers grant tsars much independence in how they undertake their 
remit: they trust them. 
9.   Tsar practices vary, even within one department. This includes 
recruitment, terms of reference, publicity, remuneration, staff support, 
oversight, working methods, reporting and any ministerial responses to 
their advice. There is no evidence of the full application of the Nolan 
Principles of Standards in Public Life to tsars. Transparency about the 
work of tsars is patchy. 
       





10.   The majority of the 260 plus tsars have made useful contributions, 
producing well-informed advice that has often led to changes in policy, 
practices or organisations. A minority of tsar appointments has resulted in 
work that was superficial and lacking objectivity or has produced no public 
output.  
11.   There is no accumulation of experience in Whitehall in the use of tsars. 
Most tsars serve only once, there is no cadre of officials developing 
expertise in supporting them. Tsars’ work is not evaluated post hoc. 
Nothing systematic about good practice with tsar appointments has been 
learned from 15 years’ experience. 
Recommendations 
Tsars are clearly here to stay. Their usefulness and effectiveness as advisors to 
government could and should be enhanced. It would be disproportionate to 
adopt a full regulatory regime to govern the appointment and management of 
tsars comparable to those used for other types of public appointment. A code of 
practice, such as those already adopted for other sources of external expertise, 
is more appropriate and practical. A code of practice together with greater 
transparency by ministers and departments about the appointment, 
management, activities and reporting of tsars, should be the stimulus to 
improvement. To this end we offer four  maxims. 
Maxim 1: Ensure that a tsar appointment is the most appropriate source 
of expert advice. 
 Appointing a tsar is one of several options a minister has for obtaining 
expert advice on a policy matter. Officials  should consider and advise 
when a tsar appointment will be more useful than other sources of expert 
advice. 
 The personal attributes required of a tsar for a particular appointment 
should be identified, in particular, career background, expertise and 
reputation. 
 The shortlist of candidates should be diverse in terms of age, gender, and 
ethnicity, and not just consist of known contacts. 
 Potential tsars should be vetted for possible conflicts of interest or doubts 
about their objectivity.  
Maxim 2: Make a ‘contract’ between the client and the tsar. 
 The terms of a tsar’s appointment should be subject to negotiation 
between the minister and the prospective tsar, in full accordance with the 
Nolan Principles of Standards in Public Life. 
 Before deciding whether to accept the invitation, prospective tsars should 
be encouraged to talk to previous tsars who worked for that minister or 
department or on relevant remits elsewhere. 
 The form of analytical, advisory and administrative support most 
appropriate for the tsar’s specific task and remit should be considered. 
 The appointment should be formalised in a written exchange between the 
minister and the tsar which specifies the terms of reference, timescale, 
       





remuneration, budget, staff support, approach and methods, publicity and 
reporting. 
Maxim 3: Ensure transparency regarding the appointment of the tsar, 
the outputs of the tsar’s work and the minister’s responses to the 
outputs.  
 Departments should always issue a press notice when tsars are appointed 
stating the terms of reference, timetable and reporting arrangements. The 
same information should also be communicated to the Chair of the 
relevant select committee. 
 Unless there are constraints of confidentiality or security, the tsar’s work 
programme and reports should be published. A dedicated website or web 
pages on the departmental website is often suitable . 
 Departments’ Annual Reports should always provide details of the 
appointment, activities, progress and reporting of the work of all their 
tsars in that year. 
 All tsar appointments should conclude with a published report, to which 
the minister should make a prompt, public and full response. 
 Select committees should consider, in relation to each tsar appointment, 
whether they wish to initiate an inquiry. 
Maxim 4: Identify and promulgate good practice in the recruitment, 
conduct and management of tsars. 
 A senior civil servant in each department should have overall responsibility 
for issuing internal guidelines for tsar appointments and for providing 
practical guidance to ministers and colleagues. 
 Departments should assess the procedures, activities, outcomes and 
impacts of each tsar appointment close to completion, and document 
lessons learned. 
 Periodically (perhaps every three years) departments should evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of their previous tsar appointments in that 
period; their conclusions on best practice should be shared across 
departments. 
 The Cabinet Office should draw upon these departmental assessments in 
drafting a Code of Practice for tsar appointments. 
 The Public Accounts Committee should consider the value for money of tsar 
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1. Ministers have long sought advice from people outside the civil service. The 
names Beveridge, Beeching and Rayner are familiar examples. In his 1989 
book on Whitehall, Peter Hennessy observed: 
Whitehall’s regulars [meaning ministers and civil servants] have long realised that 
they cannot make policy entirely on their own. For nine hundred years, beginning 
long before the first English Parliament was summoned, the permanent government 
has mustered and kept in reserve a territorial army ready to answer its country’s call. 
They have a generic term – the Great and the Good – from the unofficial title of the 
Whitehall list (now a set of computer discs) on which their names are kept.1 
Although the term ‘the Great and the Good’, and probably the list itself, have 
long passed away, the custom of ministers seeking expert advice from 
outside Whitehall continues in many forms, including expert committees, 
research and consultancy, professional advice, public consultations, 
conferences and seminars. Ministers and senior civil servants also continue to 
seek private advice from trusted acquaintances. 
2. Our research concerns a particular type of external advisor: policy tsars. 
They have grown in importance over the last 15 years but without much 
recognition of their new scale and scope either within Whitehall or among 
Whitehall watchers outside. Their rise in importance has occurred in parallel 
with that of ministers’ special advisers, yet the latter have commanded 
almost all the attention. 
3. We define a tsar as: 
an individual from outside government (though not necessarily from outside 
politics) who is publicly appointed by a government minister to advise on 
policy development or delivery on the basis of their expertise. 
For clarity of meaning we unpack this definition as follows: 
 ’an individual’ – tsars are personally appointed and it is clear to them that 
their advice will be personal too; in our view this applies equally when tsars 
have advisors appointed to work them, who may or may not endorse their 
conclusions. 
 ‘from outside government’ – they are ‘external experts’ in the words of the 
Coalition government’s pursuit of ‘open policy making.’ (see para 10ff below). 
 ‘(though not necessarily from outside politics)’ – quite a few serving or ex 
MPs or ex ministers have been appointed tsars. 
 ‘publicly appointed by a government minister’ – that is, these are public 
appointments. 
 ‘to advise on policy development or delivery’ – tsars (unlike their Russian 
predecessors) have no executive authority and most of them dislike this 
media term for that reason; nevertheless we use the term as a pragmatic 
shorthand for our definition. 
                                       
1 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, London, Secker and Warburg, 1989, p 540. 
       





 ‘on the basis of their expertise.’ – the nature of that expertise varies greatly 
but it is essential to the tsar’s authority. 
4. Between May 1997 (the start of the first of three recent consecutive Labour 
administrations to 2010) and the end of July 2012 we estimate that over 260 
such appointments were made by Whitehall ministers.2. In October 1997 the 
Prime Minister appointed Keith Hellawell, the Chief Constable of Yorkshire, as 
the government’s Anti-Drugs Co-ordinator and he became known in the 
media as the ‘drugs tsar.’ This launched the concept of the policy tsar in the 
UK and similar appointments followed.3 In the Box below we provide three 
vignettes illustrating the work of tsars. 
 
BOX 1 Three vignettes of tsars’ work 
1. Richard Caborn MP: Ambassador for the 2018 World Cup bid 
Richard Caborn (b 1943, Sheffield) trained as an engineer and worked in a large local 
steel firm. He became Labour MEP for Sheffield (1979-84) before being elected Labour 
MP for Sheffield Central (1983-2010). He was appointed Minister of State in the 
Department of the Environment (1997-1990), then in the Department of Trade and 
Industry (1999-2001). He was appointed Minister for Sport in the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport in 2001 where, from 2003 to 2005, he was involved in 
London’s successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games.  
Caborn was in post in DCMS when the government announced in February 2007 its 
support for a Football Association bid to host the 2018 World Cup. When Gordon Brown 
succeeded Tony Blair as Prime Minister in June 2007, he replaced Caborn with Gerry 
Sutcliffe, and asked Caborn to be ‘Ambassador for the 2018 World Cup bid’. In 
September that year Caborn announced that he would stand down as an MP at the next 
election. His job as Ambassador was to oversee the appointment of the bid team, to 
liaise between ministers and the Football Association and to lobby the world football 
governing body FIFA who would award the 2018 World Cup. There is no evidence in the 
public domain about his work as the Ambassador; nor is it known whether he was paid. 
He alone was listed as an ’Observer’ on the World Cup bid Board.  
Preparation of the UK bid generated a great deal of controversy and criticism involving 
several interested individuals and organisations. The UK bid was submitted in March 
2009. Allegations of bribery were made about some members of FIFA’s executive 
committee. In December 2010 FIFA awarded the 2018 World Cup to Russia; the UK bid 




                                       
2 We aware that similar appointments have been made in the devolved administrations, 
in local and public authorities, in quangos, in the European Union and by foreign 
governments. But we have not researched these. 
3 The title ‘tsar’ derives from Caesar, which was given to all Roman emperors from 
Augustus to Hadrian. It is ‘the root of both the German Kaiser and the Russian Tsar, 
used in the USA for a boss since the mid 19th century, and an officially appointed person 
in charge of something since the mid 20th c. ’ Julia Cresswell, ‘Caesar’, Oxford Dictionary 
of Word Origins, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2009. Keith Hellawell’s appointment 
followed appointments of advisors on drugs policy by US presidents (the preferred US 
spelling is ‘czar’) and the term adopted there was picked up in the UK. 
       





2. Gerry Grimstone: Reviewer of the use of civilians in defence 
Gerry Grimstone was 60 in December 2009, when he was appointed by Bob Ainsworth, 
the Labour Secretary of State for Defence, as the reviewer of the use of civilians in 
defence. He had been a civil servant in the Department of Health and Social Security 
from 1972 to 1982 and HM Treasury from 1982 to 1986. He then moved to the financial 
services sector, from 1986 to 1999 at Schroeders, followed by Candover Investments 
(1999-2011) and is now Chairman of Standard Life. He has held several non-executive 
directorships in business and public bodies, including the Tote and MOD’s Strike 
Command Board. His review was timed to be an input to the Labour government’s 
forthcoming Strategic Defence Review.  
Grimstone’s remit was to focus on the distribution of tasks between military and civilian 
personnel and the scope for further reductions in the number of civilians. He was 
specifically not to explore some related topics which were being examined separately but 
to coordinate his work closely with them. He was given a team of MOD officials to work 
with him and a senior MOD official was his departmental liaison. He was unpaid. He 
produced an Interim Report after three months in March 2010 and a Final Report in June 
2010. In the event the May general election intervened and his report was submitted to 
Liam Fox, the new Secretary of State for Defence. Both reports were published by MoD.  
Grimstone’s recommendations for civilian manpower reductions and the creation of a 
new Defence Business Services Organisation to provide corporate services to the 
department were adopted, with acknowledgement to the Grimstone review, in the 
Coalition government’s October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. By then 
Grimstone himself had been appointed a member of the new Defence Reform Unit, 
launched in September 2010, to ‘develop a “leaner and less centralised" department and 
make "significant savings" in running costs.’ He is also lead Non-executive Director on 
MOD’s Board of Management. 
3. Baroness Helen Newlove, Champion for active, safer communities 
Helen Newlove’s husband was murdered in Warrington in August 2007 after confronting 
a gang of drunken youths who were vandalising her car. After his death she started 
campaigning against binge drinking. In 2008 she set up the Newlove Warrington 
Foundation aiming to make the town a safer and better place to live. Her work attracted 
national publicity and in the 2010 Dissolution Honours she was given a peerage, and 
took her seat in the House of Lords in July 2010 as a Conservative.  
In October that year Home Secretary Theresa May appointed her as the government’s 
‘Champion for active, safer communities’ to encourage (in the words of the Home Office 
press release) the ‘active part people can play, alongside the frontline, in tackling the 
problems that matter most in their neighbourhoods’ ; clearly part of David Cameron’s 
Big Society agenda. In this role she embarked on visits and discussions around England 
and Wales, with a particular focus on seven neighbourhoods, recording her experiences 
on a personal blog. She presumably had a team of assistants, though there is no record 
of this. The Home Office paid her a fee of £20,000 for three days a week for six months, 
plus almost £12,000 for travel and accommodation expenses.  
The outcome was a 60 page report Our vision for safe and active communities published 
by the Home Office in March 2011. She described it as ‘not a typical Government report. 
It is written for activists by an activist.’ She reported her findings, including case studies 
of community initiatives in the seven neighbourhoods, and made recommendations for 
action by communities, local agencies and central government. Thereafter, Newlove’s 
departmental client became the Department for Communities and Local Government. In 
July 2011 DCLG published her Government Progress Update (with a Foreword by the 
Prime Minster) which also set out her next priorities. Her third report Building Safe, 
Active Communities: Strong foundations by local people was published in February 2012. 
Her appointment ended in March 2012. Newlove has continued to campaign; she is Chair 
       





of the All Party Parliamentary Group for victims and witnesses of crime and Chair of the 
Advisory Board of Community Alcohol Partnerships. 
 
5. Tsars always report to and are appointed by ministers. Technically, tsars hold 
public office and are not employees of the government. This makes them 
public appointments according to the definition in the Cabinet Manual:  
A public appointment is an appointment to the board of a public body or to an 
office…Public appointees of this kind are not employees but office-holders. Most 
public appointments are made by ministers.4 …Ministers re ultimately responsible for 
the appointments they make and will have involvement in some way in the 
process…and will make the final decision on which candidate to appoint.5  
Research question 
6. Our research question was: How do the development of policy and 
practice by governments benefit from Whitehall’s use of Tsars?  
To answer this we sought to find out what appointments have been made, 
how tsars are recruited, from which backgrounds they come, how they work 
and what support they have, what outputs they produce and what outcomes 
and impacts follow. 
7. Several other sources of external expertise are available to ministers in 
Whitehall departments. The most important, aside from tsars, are: 
 expert committees or panels, appointed by government or created 
independently 
 public inquiries  
 professional advice commissioned, for example, from a lawyer or 
economist  
 reports and briefings from think tanks and research centres 
 government agencies and NDPBs with specialist expertise on their field  
 researchers or consultants commissioned by departments 
 lobbying by NGOs, professional, business and trade organisations 
 conferences and seminars, convened by government (sometimes called 
summits) or independently 
 audits, inspections and scrutinies, such as the work of the National Audit 
Office, Ofsted or HM Inspector of Prisons 
 responses to government consultations 
 informal conversations with experts, by ministers or officials. 
8. In addition, ministers have access to internal sources of expertise: from civil 
servants who include economists, statisticians, social researchers, lawyers, 
armed service officers, clinicians, scientists, policy units, delivery units and 
special advisers.  
                                       
4 Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual, 2011, para 7.18.  
5 ibid., para 7.20. 
       





9. Throughout our research we have sought to identify what tsars, as expert 
advisors, offer to ministers that differs from these other sources of external 
and internal advice. In previous research we explored the experience of 
experts, people who had come to work in Whitehall departments from outside 
of government.6 We identified twelve routes by which outsiders could 
contribute to the work of Whitehall, of which tsar appointments were one. 
Tsar appointments have grown in scale and scope since this initial research 
was completed. This study focuses specifically on tsars and looks in greater 
depth at the nature of the expertise they bring and the benefits of their work. 
The context of ‘open policy making’ 
10. The use of these various kinds of internal and external expertise was given 
a new impetus by the Coalition government’s Civil Service Reform Plan 
(June 2012). It favours what it terms ‘open policymaking’ and promotes 
greater outsourcing of policy advice as a step towards that: 
 Whitehall has a virtual monopoly on policy development, which means that policy is 
often drawn up on the basis of too narrow a range of inputs and is not subject to 
external challenge prior to announcement….the need to maintain a safe space for 
policy advice should not be used to prevent the maximum possible openness to 
new thinking or in the gathering of evidence and insight from external experts.7 
11. David Cameron, appearing before the House of Commons Liaison 
Committee on 3 July 2012, expressed this from a ministerial perspective: 
 We should also recognise that the civil service does not have a monopoly on policy 
wisdom, so we have what we call policy contestability. On some occasions, we 
should go outside the civil service and say, ‘Here’s a particular challenge’ – for 
example setting up the green investment bank – ‘Can you help us O think-tank or 
O academic body, in developing this policy?’8 
12. Strangely, these statements, and the text of the Civil Service Reform Plan 
itself, do not acknowledge the now longstanding role of tsars in the desired 
‘outsourcing’ of policy advice. Cameron himself has appointed many tsars 
since 2010, including Sir Ronald Cohen and Nick O’ Donohoe in 2011 to 
develop a proposal for a Big Society Bank to invest in social enterprises, an 
initiative not that dissimilar to the imaginary ‘green investment bank’ in the 
Prime Minister’s statement. Francis Maude MP, the Cabinet Office minister 
responsible for civil service reform, issued a press notice on 1 August 2012 
announcing that he was commissioning a project to supply advice on the 
structure and operation of government in other countries as part of the 
Reform Plan. He said:  
                                       
6 Ruth Levitt and William Solesbury, ‘Outsiders in Whitehall’, Public Money and 
Management, 2006, 26/1, pp 10-12. See also Ruth Levitt and William Solesbury, 
Evidence-informed policy: what difference do outsiders in Whitehall make?, ESRC UK 
Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice, 2005, Working Paper 23; 
www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/politicaleconomy/research/cep/pubs/papers/assets/wp
23.pdf. 
7 HM Government, The Civil Service Reform Plan, June 2012, p 14. 
8 House of Commons Liaison Committee, Oral evidence from the Prime Minister, 3 July 
2012, Q60, Session 2012-13, to be published as HC 484-i. 
       





 For the first time ever [our emphasis] ministers are directly commissioning policy 
advice from outside Whitehall moving towards our goal of opening up policy 
making.9  
The claim in August 2012 that outside experts are being used ‘for the first 
time ever’ indicates that the 260 plus ministerial appointments of tsars as 
outside experts over the last 15 years remain invisible. 
Sources and research methods 
13. There is no readily available single source listing all tsar appointments. 
Each department has discretion over what information they publish about 
their tsars; the Cabinet Office and No 10 do not hold or maintain 
information about tsars across departments. There has been almost no 
previous research or consultancy specifically on tsars. Research on the 
broader issue of the relationship between expertise and policy is also 
relatively sparse, most of it focused on (natural) scientific knowledge and 
policy. Some references to relevant research are included in footnotes.  
14. The main steps in our research were as follows: 
 List: Create a list all tsar appointments as defined in para 5 above made 
between 1 May 1997 (the start of the first Labour administration) and 31 
July 2012 (our cut-off point for our empirical research). We used 
departmental, parliamentary and other bodies’ documents and websites, 
print and broadcast media and other sources to find details. The list in 
Annex 1.1 is not definitive although we are confident that it includes almost 
all the tsar appointments made in the period.  
 Profile: For each tsar we constructed a summary profile (see Annex 2.1) 
using public domain information, where available, to record their official 
title, start and end dates, client department, appointing minister, 
professional background and expertise, payment, reporting and outcomes, 
gender, age and ethnicity. For about half of the whole list we also recorded 
fuller information (see Annex 2.2) on each of those elements, adding 
details of the type of remit, scope of work, the tsar’s working methods, 
assistance and subsequent roles.10 We developed working definitions for 
each of these characteristics in the interest of clarity and consistency.  
 FOI: For some tsars there was little or nothing in the public domain about 
some characteristics. This was frequently the case for remuneration and 
quite often true for reporting and outcomes of certain types of remit. We 
initiated Freedom of Information requests to seek such information on 
these two matters for a small sample of tsars, only some of which yielded 
results (see Annexes 3.1 and 3.2). 
 Donors: We searched the Electoral Commission’s register of political 
donations for the tsars, particularly for those with business backgrounds. 
                                       
9 Cabinet Office, Looking abroad for next steps in Civil Service Reform Programme, Press 
Notice CAB 073-12, 11 August 2012. 
10 We are grateful for valuable assistance from six postgraduate students in the 
Department of Political Economy at King’s College London in 2011-12, who chose our 
project for a work placement as part of their MA in Public Policy; see Acknowledgements. 
       





 Biographies: We searched biographies and autobiographies of several 
leading politicians and books by journalists published during the last ten 
years for references to individual prominent tsars.  
 Print and online news items: We found media reports for about 20 of 
the Labour appointments and about 50 of the Coalition appointments. 
 Parliament: With the help of the House of Commons Library’s database we 
were also able to check parliamentary references (in ministerial statements, 
parliamentary questions and select committee inquiries) for a 25% sample 
of tsars.  
 Quantitative analysis: Data in the profiles was used to measure the 
frequency of key characteristics among our population of tsars and identify 
key associations between characteristics: we looked particularly at whether 
the appointments of tsars with similar career backgrounds and/or 
expertises correlated to other factors. 
 Previous research: We reviewed existing research on public policy that 
could help us understand and interpret the data. In particular we explored 
two issues. First, what existing theoretical and empirical research reveals 
about Whitehall policy making processes. Second, we sought to understand 
the role of expert knowledge or evidence in such processes. We refer to 
relevant publications in the text and footnotes below.  
 Hypotheses: Arising from the empirical data we devised some hypotheses 
that might help answer our research question. The hypotheses concerned 
the motives of ministers in appointing tsars, the motives of those who 
accept such appointments, how tsars come to be selected, and how their 
remits come to be defined. In addition, they sought to understand how 
their work is supported and overseen by departments, why certain working 
methods are chosen, when reports of their work do or do not get 
submitted, and why some tsar appointments have successful outcomes in 
changes to policy or practice while others do not.  
 Interviews: We tested the hypotheses in interviews with tsars and others. 
The interview sample included tsars with different remits, different 
professional backgrounds, and those appointed by Labour and Coalition 
ministers. We interviewed 16 tsars, mostly face to face, and 24 of the 
colleagues, ministers and officials with whom they worked by phone. The 
interviews revealed more about what motivated the tsars to accept 
appointment, the nature of their relations with ministers and officials, their 
dis/satisfaction with the experience and its results. Interviews with 
colleagues, ministers and officials provided contrasting perspective on such 
issues. Annex 4 lists our interviewees. 
 Discussions: We discussed work in progress with ‘Whitehall watchers’, 
academics, researchers, commentators, individuals and organisations 
interested in policy processes to get their views on the significance of what 
we were discovering about the role of tsars over the last 15 years. They are 
also listed in Annex 4. With the same objective we presented a paper on 
the research at the Policy and Politics conference 2012 in Bristol on 18 
September 2012.  
 Writings and broadcasts: From the outset of the research we aimed to 
communicate work in progress to a wide range of people and organisations. 
       





We have written articles published in the professional and general media 
and contributed to features on radio and television and the press. We are 
presenting the work at several seminars and workshops in the coming 
months (see Annex 5). 
       





2 The rise of tsar appointments 1997-2012 
The number of tsars 
15. Whitehall maintains no records of tsar appointments. From public sources 
have identified all tsar appointments made by Whitehall ministers between 
May 1997 and July 2012 (Table 1). In that period 225 people undertook 
267 appointments; they are listed in Annex 1.1 Nearly three quarters of the 
appointees (197 or 74%) served as a tsar only once. The remaining one 
quarter (70 or 26%) of appointments, were what we termed ‘serial tsars’, 
each being appointed between two and five times (Table 2 and Table 3); 
they are listed in Annex 1.2. The current record holders, with five 
appointments each, are:  
 Lord Carter of Coles, founder of Westminster Healthcare in 1985, 
subsequently director of public and private companies in the fields of 
insurance, healthcare and IT, a Labour peer since 1994, Chairman of Sport 
England 2001-06 undertook reviews of Offender management (2002),11 the 
Criminal Records Bureau (2003), Public diplomacy (2004), legal aid 
procurement (2005) and NHS Pathology services (2005). 
 Professor Martin Cave, an academic specialist in regulatory economics and 
currently Deputy Chair of the Competition Commission, undertook reviews 
of radio spectrum management (2001), spectrum holdings (2004), social 
housing regulation (2006), competition in water markets (2008) and airport 
regulation (2008) as well as acting as an adviser to other tsars on their 
reviews. 
16. Ten appointments (4%) were made to pairs of individuals (only the first 
name is counted for the purposes of this analysis); they are listed in Annex 
1.3. 
100% 267 total appointments  
74% 197 appointee’s only appointment 
26% 70 appointee had 2-5 appointments 
Table 1 Tsars: appointments 
 
100% 225 total individuals 
88% 197  1 appointment 
12% 28  multiple appointments 
Table 2 Tsars: individuals 
 
100% 28 multiple appointments 
71% 20   two appointments 
14% 4  three appointments 
                                       
11 Here and throughout the date is the start date of the tsar’s appointment. 
       





7% 2  four appointments 
7% 2   five appointments 
Table 3 Tsars: multiple appointments 
17. We excluded three categories of public appointments made by ministers 
between 1997 and 2012, which have some similarities to tsar appointments 
as we define them (para 3) and are sometimes called tsars. We excluded 
them because these appointees served for longer terms and were 
appointed to more established positions than most tsar appointments. 
Together they comprise another approximately 110 individuals in the 
following three categories: 
 National Clinical Directors in the Department of Health, popularly called 
‘cancer tsar’ (Professor Sir Mike Richards), ‘mental health tsar’ (Dr Hugh 
Griffith) and so on. They are leading health and social care practitioners 
employed as civil servants to ‘oversee the implementation of a National 
Service Framework’, in other words to advise and promote policy and 
practice in their specialism. Most of them are appointed to serve for a 
number of years, unlike the temporary one-off nature of tsars’ 
assignments. At least 27 such appointments have been made, some are 
part-time, some are seconded to the Department.12  
 Business Ambassadors, appointed by UKTI (UK Trade and Investment) 
which is a joint non-ministerial Government Department of the 
Departments for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office. Business Ambassadors are individuals in the 
business and academic worlds engaged to promote the UK’s ‘...excellence, 
economy, business environment and its reputation as the international 
trade and inward investment partner of choice’ on trade and diplomatic 
missions, at conferences and other events. Most of them combine this with 
their own personal or business travel. There are about 30 of them.13  
 Non-executive directors, appointed by ministers to boards of government 
departments and other public bodies, have standing appointments and 
serve a term as board members, though they may sometimes be asked by 
a minister or permanent secretary to undertake specific tasks; a recent 
example is Sam Laidlaw, Centrica CEO and member of the DTP Board, 
undertaking a review of the withdrawn decision on the West Coast rail 
franchise. There are currently 55 such appointments.14 
The rising trend in appointing tsars 
18. Tsar appointments have risen steadily with each of the four governments 
considered. The first Labour administration (1997-2001) made 14 
appointments. The second Labour administration (2001-05) tripled that 
                                       
12 Professor Martin Smith has written about these appointments in Martin J Smith, ‘Tsars, 
leadership and innovation in the public sector’, Policy and Politics, 39/3, 2011, 343-359. 
13 UKTI Annual Report and Accounts, 2011-12, June 2012, HC 47. 
14 Out of sixteen departments, one has two NEDs (DfID), five have three (BIS DCMS 
DECC FCO MOD), eight have four (CO DES DCLG, MOJ DTp HO DEFRA HMT), two have 
five (DH DWP) https://update.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/non-
executive-directors-NEDs-march2012.pdf. 
       





number, appointing 45, and the third (2005-10) tripled it again to 130. By 
July 2012 the Coalition administration had made 93 appointments. 
Recognising the different durations of these governments, we have 
calculated annual rates. Table 4 and Figure 1 below show this reveals a 








Table 4 Rate of tsar appointments 1997-2012 
*(total exceeds 267 because Coalition renewed some Labour appointments)  
 
- 
Figure 1 Annual rate of tsar appointments 1997-2012 
19. This rising trend of appointments has held true in favourable and in difficult 
economic conditions, during periods of acute political tension at home and 
abroad (e.g. the Iraq war, MPs’ expenses scandal) and notwithstanding 
ministerial reshuffles, the prime ministerial change from Blair to Brown in 
2007 and three general elections. Ministers of different political 
complexions find tsar appointments an increasingly attractive method for 
obtaining expert advice, perhaps preferring it to internal expertise of 
officials or the other more traditional forms of external expertise (e.g. from 
advisory committees or consultancy or commissioned research). 
Outsourcing policy advice is certainly not as novel as the Civil Service 
















Government Duration of govt No of appointments Rate pa 
Total 182 months 282* 19 
Labour 1997-2001 49 months 14 3 
Labour 2001-2005 47 months 45 11 
Labour 2005-2010 60 months 130 26 
Coalition 2010-2012 26 months 93 43 
       





3 Which ministers appointed the tsars? 
Frequency of tsar appointments 
20. Since 1997 seventy seven ministers have appointed tsars, although some 
used tsars far more than others. About half have just appointed one, the 
other half have made multiple appointments (Table 5).  
100% 77 ministers appointed tsars 
53% 41 ministers made multiple appointments  
47% 36 ministers made single appointments (counting lead minister only) 
10% 27 appointments were made by two or more ministers 
Table 5 Number of ministers appointing tsars 
21. Table 6 lists the numbers of tsar appointments made by individual ministers 
who held office at some time between 1997 and 2012. The largest number 
of tsar appointments was made by Gordon Brown, as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer for 10 years (23 appointments) and Prime Minister for three 
years (another 23 appointments); followed by David Cameron as Prime 
Minister in the two years to mid 2012 (21 appointments). Other ministers 
made 11 or fewer appointments each during their tenure, in one or more 
departments. 
100% 267 Total appointments 
17%  46  Brown (23 as Chancellor, 23 as Prime Minister) 
8% 21 Cameron 
25% 67 Brown + Cameron 
4% 11 Balls, Darling, Gove 
4% 10 Kelly 
 7 Adonis, Straw  
 6 Johnson 
 5 Blair, Burnham, Cable, Hutton, Mandelson, May, Smith 
 4 Blunkett, Clarke, Hewitt, Maude 
 3 Beckett, Benn, Denham, Hague, Osborne, Teather 
 2 14 other ministers 
Table 6 Ministers who appointed tsars 
22. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown mostly appointed tsars to 
undertake ‘independent reviews’ timed to feed in to decisions reflected in 
the budget and Spending Reviews. These appointments also illustrate the 
role he adopted in relation to domestic policy, asserting his authority to 
shape decisions in areas where lead responsibility belonged to other 
ministers (though ministers from those departments were often billed as 
       





co-appointers). This was reportedly based on the ‘Granita deal’.15 Examples 
include the appointments of: 
 Derek Wanless to report on population health (2003) 
 Kate Barker to review housing supply (2003) and the land use planning 
system (2005) 
 Sir Michael Lyons to review local government finance (2004) 
 Lord Leitch to review the UK’s long term skill needs (2004). 
23. Peter Riddell commented in 2005: 
 Brown has been very fond of commissioning reviews by businessmen to look at 
problems. Every Budget and pre-Budget report has either launched some new 
reviews or reported the results of two or three existing ones. We have had, 
amongst many others, Atkinson (measuring public sector productivity), Barker 
(housing supply), Clementi (regulation of legal services), Cruickshank (competition 
in banking), Gershon (efficiency savings in government), Hampton (the burden on 
business of regulatory inspection and enforcement), Higgs (the role of non-
executive directors), Lambert (university organisation and business links), Lyons 
(local government finance), Miles (the factors limiting the development of a fixed-
rate mortgage market in Britain), Pickering (simplification of pensions legislation 
and regulation), Sandler (long-term retail savings), Taylor (interaction of the tax 
and benefit system), Turner (adequacy of future pension provision), and Wanless 
(funding of the NHS). The list would make a wonderful Gilbert and Sullivan patter 
song. Brown cites these reports to justify changes he is introducing. However, 
impressive though most of these reports have been in their analyses, the record of 
implementation has been patchy.16 
This practice continued with Chancellors Alastair Darling and George 
Osborne. 
24. As Prime Ministers Brown and Cameron have both been strong 
commissioners of tsars, even though Prime Ministers are not responsible for 
designing policies in many specific areas. Blair, Brown and Cameron 
together appointed 49 tsars (nearly 20% of all the tsar appointments), 
often in association with other ministers, whose departments managed the 
detailed arrangements. A Prime Minister’s imprimatur on an appointment 
elevates the attention given to and the significance of the appointment in 
three ways: it provides an added impetus to a particular policy issue, 
perhaps when a Prime Minister wants to urge a minister to do more; it 
gives the tsar higher level political support; and it generates greater 
publicity. Examples include:  
 Tony Blair’s appointment of Louise Casey as Homelessness Tsar (1999)  
 Gordon Brown’s appointment (2009) and David Cameron‘s confirmation 
(2010) of Martha Lane Fox as Digital Champion 
                                       
15 The ‘Granita deal’ (named after the Islington restaurant where it was struck) refers to 
an agreement between Blair and Brown, after the death of John Smith as Labour Party 
leader, whereby Brown stepped back from seeking election as leader in return for an 
assurance that, should Labour come to power, he would as Chancellor of the Exchequer 
have a degree of overlordship of domestic policy. 
16 Peter Riddell, The Unfulfilled Prime Minister: Tony Blair’s quest for a legacy, London, 
Politico’s, 2005, p 80. 
       





 Gordon Brown’s appointment of Dame Stephanie Shirley as Giving and 
Philanthropy Ambassador (2009) 
 David Cameron’s and Nick Clegg’s appointment of Mary Portas to review 
the future for high street shopping (2011). 
Some of these Prime Ministerial appointments prompted tensions with 
ministerial colleagues. Two well-documented cases were Blair’s choice of 
Adair Turner to review pensions and David Freud to review welfare. In his 
memoir Blair himself observed: 
 At the end of 2002 I had appointed Adair Turner to do a review of pensions policy. 
This had provoked strong opposition from Gordon[Brown], as had the appointment 
of David Freud, an independent consultant, to do a similar review on welfare. I 
knew Adair and David would give me radical proposals. Both issues had to be 
confronted.17 
 Both the Turner proposals and those of Freud gave us a huge opportunity to 
characterise, define and implement reforms of a vital nature not just for the 
country [but] for the survival of the government.18 
25. Several Education ministers have been keen to appoint tsars: Ruth Kelly, 
Ed Balls, Michael Gove. Lord Adonis appointed seven tsars: two in his three 
years as an education minister: Tony Hall on Youth Dance (2007) and John 
Stannard on Gifted and Talented Children (2007); and five in his two years 
as Secretary of State for Transport: Sir Peter Hall and Chris Green on rail 
station standards (2009), Sir Peter North on drink and drug driving law 
(2009), Sir Andrew Foster on the InterCity Express programme (2010), 
David Quarmby on winter resilience of the transport system (2010) and Sir 
Roy McNulty on rail value for money (2010). 
26. One minister we interviewed offered three overlapping explanations for 
making these appointments: (1) they provide eminent and relevant 
expertise otherwise not available from internal sources; (2) they can 
provide more concentrated analysis of an issue, especially where ‘new 
directions’ are needed; and (3) they offer the hope or expectation that their 
report will generate consensus on a difficult or contentious issue. 
27. Ministers from six departments19 made two thirds of all the tsar the 
appointments: HMT, DfE, BIS, CO, DH and the Prime Minister (Table 7). 
Treasury ministers, as noted above, often commissioned reviews in order to 
put departmental policies and spending under the spotlight as part of the 
spending and budgeting reviews. The Treasury’s commitment to reviews 
was evidenced by the continuing custom of providing pages on its website 
that present information and links to present and some past work by their 
tsars. In the Cabinet Office (CO), the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS) and the Department for Education (DfE) aspects of 
departmental culture may explain the prevalence of tsar appointments. The 
CO has a very small staff and little in-house analytical capacity. BIS may 
particularly seek to tap the expertise of the business community, and finds 
                                       
17 Tony Blair, A Journey, London, Hutchinson, 2010, p 584. 
18 ibid., p 588. 
19 Throughout we use the current departmental titles and in our analysis have ascribed 
tsars appointed to earlier, otherwise titled departments to their present successors.  
       





most of its tsars from there. DfE has always had contentious relations with 
its main stakeholders: the teaching professions, the local education 
authorities and the academic education research community. This tension 
may encourage DfE to seek advice from independent sources to strengthen 
its position.  
100% 267 Total appointments 
19% 51 HMT (+3)* 
12% 33 DfE (+6) 
10% 28 BIS (+6) 
8% 22 CO (+1) 
7% 20 DH (+1) 
7% 18 PM  
65% 173 sub total 
Table 7 Departments: no. of tsar appointments (six highest)  
*(appointments in brackets when dept not lead appointer; not in totals) 
28. Some ministers are clearly less inclined to appoint tsars than others (Table 
8). One reason for this may be that they have adequate internal sources of 
expertise to draw on or other satisfactory ways of tapping external 
expertise. DfID is a distinctive case: since 1997 it has appointed only one 
tsar, Lord Paddy Ashdown, to review humanitarian relief (2010). This may 
be because DfID staff are already highly professionalised at home and 
overseas, it generally has good relations with its stakeholders, especially 
the NGOs, and it is committed to openness and consultation in its policy 
development. 
9 FCO  
7 DCLG (+3); MOD (+1) 
6 DEFRA (+2) 
5 DCMS (+2); DECC 
1 DfID (+1) 
0 Attorney General (+1) 
Table 8 Departments: no. of tsar appointments (six lowest) 
Appointment processes 
29. Tsars are appointed directly by ministers. A few tsars are statutory 
appointments that ministers must make, and they are covered by the 
Commissioner for Public Appointments and the Code of Practice for 
Ministerial Appointments that he issues (see para 30 below). These are the 
Children’s Commissioner for England (under the Children Act 2004), the 
Schools Commissioner for England (under the Education Inspections Act 
2006) and the Victims Commissioner (under the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009).20 With these statutory appointments, the minister nominates a 
                                       
20 This post became vacant in 2011, when Louise Casey, a permanent civil servant and 
therefore no longer a tsar by our definition, who had held it since 2010, moved to a new 
post in the Department of Communities and Local Government, and the Ministry of 
       





preferred candidate, who is then subject to a pre-appointment hearing and 
opinion from the appropriate parliamentary select committee; an opinion 
that the minister is free to reject. Ed Balls, as Secretary of State for 
Education, overruled the Education Committee’s views when he appointed 
Maggie Atkinson as Children’s Commissioner in 2010. Her appointment was 
confirmed and renewed after the change of government although the 
Coalition minister, Michael Gove, had criticised her appointment when he 
was in Opposition. 
30. For the majority of tsar appointments the minister’s decisions to make an 
appointment and who to appoint is unfettered: it is an informal process 
unregulated by either the Commissioner for Public Appointments or the 
Cabinet Office. The remit of the Commissioner covers ministerial 
appointments to the boards of public bodies and to statutory offices and his 
procedures, enshrined in a Code of Practice,21 are based on principles of 
merit, fairness and openness. Tsar appointments do not come within his 
remit. The Cabinet Office, which leads within Whitehall on public 
appointments of all kinds,22 has not published a code of practice for tsar 
appointments, though it has done so for special advisers23 and for 
consultation24 and research procurement.25 However, the Cabinet Office has 
said that it will be publishing revised guidance soon on making and 
managing public appointments, which will become a responsibility of a new 
Centre for Public Appointments in the Cabinet Office.  
31. Tsar posts are rarely advertised or handled through formal appointment 
procedures.26 Our interviews with tsars revealed a typical sequence of 
steps. First discreet overtures are made, usually by phone by a senior 
official or a special adviser: ‘The minister just wonders if you might be 
                                                                                                                       
Justice took the opportunity to reconsider the future of the role with its national remit, in 
the light of elections in 2012 of local Police and Crime Commissioners with powers to 
establish local victim services. 
21 Commissioner for Public Appointments, Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointments 
to Public Bodies, April 2012. 
22 The Cabinet Office’s categorisation of public bodies includes ‘reviews’ along with ‘ad 
hoc advisory bodies’ and ‘task forces’ as kinds of a class of ‘Advisory Bodies’ which it 
characterises as sources of expert advice to Government, with membership drawn from 
outside Whitehall, a lifespan of less than two years, a single issue focus and no 
employed staff but they may be supported by civil servants, Cabinet Office, Categories of 
Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, April 2011. 





25 See the Government Procurement Service: http://gps.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/. 
26 Martin Smith reports in relation to the appointment of National Clinical Directors in DH 
that ‘although later appointments have been advertised, with formal interviews and 
proper contracts of employment, the early ones were appointed with almost no reference 
to rules on appointments and a number of tsars wrote their own job descriptions.’ 
op.cit., p 349. 
       





interested in helping us…’; the minister or officials may have identified that 
person. A shortlist of alternative candidates is not always drawn up, 
although if the first person declines the invitation a new name must be 
identified and approached. Interviews revealed that the candidate is almost 
always ‘known’ to the minister, either ‘known of’ or ‘personally known.’ One 
tsar said that when he was approached by Gordon Brown about his 
appointment the Chancellor said: 
This one has your name on it….let’s talk.  
32. Candidates usually come from a circle of people active in the relevant policy 
domain, whether in business, as academics, practitioners, retired public 
servants, politicians or people with other kinds of relevant expertise.27 They 
sometimes have practical experience in the field in which they are invited to 
advise, or have highly developed analytical skills that they can apply. Most 
of our tsar interviewees could trace the history of connections to the 
minister that had brought them into the frame for the offer of appointment. 
Reputation and trustworthiness, as much as expertise, are clearly crucial 
criteria that ministers use to identify tsars. 
33. Overt party political support is rarely a consideration. One recent example 
was Adrian Beecroft, a known Conservative party donor, who was 
appointed in the summer of 2011 to advise on reforms to employment law; 
this was not announced publicly and originally may not have been a tsar 
appointment according to our definition. His unpublished report, dated 
October 2011, was noticed by the media seven months later following sight 
of a leaked copy; BIS published the report in May 2012. Our investigation 
of the Electoral Commission’s registers28 show that party donors were 
relatively rare among tsars: only 13 (5%) of the 267 appointees had made 
donations, and all three main parties had benefited (Table 9).  
34. Following the initial approach and the candidate’s acceptance, department 
officials establish the arrangements. The next steps may be handled by the 
minister’s private office or the permanent secretary’s office or delegated to 
the relevant policy directorate. The tsar meets the special adviser or a civil 
servant, occasionally the minister, to explore the brief for the work. They 
may negotiate some details, timetables and support arrangements. Formal 
terms of reference are only agreed in some cases and put in writing 
between the minister and the tsar. For the majority of appointments 
remuneration was neither offered, requested or expected, based on the 
assumption that the work was pro bono (see para 68ff). Payment of fees 
only arises if the tsar is freelance or their employer requires compensation 
for lost time, as with most universities. Departments may sometimes check 
for candidates’ potential conflicts of interest (and may seek advice from the 
Cabinet Office’s Propriety and Ethics Team). The tsar’s prior stance on the 
                                       
27 We use the term ‘circle of people’ rather than ‘policy community’ or ‘policy network’ 
for people with an interest in a policy domain and perhaps common ambitions to change 
policy there. In our view the terms ‘community’, ‘network’ or ’group’ suggest a greater 
degree of cohesion than we perceive characterised the ‘circles’ from which most tsars 
came. 
28 Electoral Commission, Party and election finance registers, 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/party-finance/PEF-online-registers. 
       





issues to be addressed – their objectivity – may or may not be assessed. 
The inadequacy of vetting was highlighted with David Cameron’s 
appointment of Emma Harrison as his ‘Troubled Families Tsar’ when her 
company A4e was already subject to fraud investigations in relation to 
government contracts.29  




Total Party Date 
Young, Lord David 1 £1,700 Con 2008 
Neuberger, Baroness Julia 1 £1,800 LD 2011 
Leitch, Lord Sandy 1 £5,000 Lab 2007 
Thoresen, Otto 1 £5,100 LD 2007 
Haskins, Lord Chris 2 £10,000 / £2,500 Lab/LD 2001/2006 
Myners, Sir Paul 2 £12,700 Lab 2007 
Sharman, Lord Colin 9 £29,217 LD 2004-11 
Carter, Lord Patrick 3 £35,000 Lab 2009-10 
Ashcroft, Lord Michael 9 £114,926 Con 2001-6 
Sugar, Lord Alan 7 £285,750 Lab 2001; 2011-12 
Beecroft, Adrian 10 £643,076 Con 2006-11 
Cohen, Sir Ronald 10 £2,300,000 Lab 2001-9 
Sainsbury, Lord David 64 £11,107,637 Lab  2004-12 
Table 9 Tsar donors to political parties 
Source: Electoral Commission 
35. The Cabinet Manual states that:  
All public appointees are expected to work to the highest personal and professional 
standards. To this end codes of conduct are in place for…all public appointees. 
Along with others in public life, they are expected to follow the Seven Principles of 
Public Life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty 
and leadership.30 
However, there is no code of conduct for tsars whereas there are ‘codes’ for 
many of the other sources of external expert advice to ministers, namely 
                                       
29 On 29 February 2012 Nick Raynsford MP asked the Prime Minister ‘what independent 
checks he believes should be carried out before such appointments are made and 
whether any such checks were carried out in respect of Emma Harrison?’ The Prime 
Minister stated that he ‘was not aware of any allegations of irregularities when Emma 
Harrison became an adviser on troubled families to the Government…I have asked the 
Cabinet Secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, to review the guidelines across Government and 
in this particular case.’ Hansard, House of Commons, 29 February 2012, col 286. The 
results of that review have not been made public. 
30 Cabinet Office, Cabinet Manual, 2011, para 7.22. According to the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, “These principles apply to all aspects of public life.  The 
Committee has set them out here for the benefit of all who serve the public in any way.” 
www.public-standards.gov.uk/Library/Seven_principles.doc. 
       





procedures to be followed in procuring research and consultancy; guidelines 
for securing scientific advice from expert committees; a code of conduct for 
special advisers; and a code on conducting and responding to government 
consultations. There is nothing relevant to tsars in the Civil Service code. 
The Ministerial Code has a section on Ministers and Appointments, which 
states: 
 Public appointments should be made in accordance with the requirements of the 
law and, where appropriate, the Code of Practice issued by the Commissioner for 
Public Appointments. 
The phrase ‘where appropriate’ could be read as exempting tsar 
appointments from compliance with the Commissioner’s code.31 
36. A departmental press notice may announce the appointment of a tsar. The 
appointment of tsars and the progress of their work is only fitfully noted in 
departments’ Annual Reports. Our examination of the House of Commons 
Library’s database revealed announcements to parliament of a tsar 
appointment in only 18% of our sample. In its report on Goats and Tsars in 
2009 the Public Administration Select Committee recommended that each 
department, in its Departmental Annual Report, should provide a brief 
account of the work of appointed tsars and that ministers should notify the 
Chair of the relevant select committee of tsar appointments. The 
government responded: 
...The Government does not support the Committee’s recommendations at this 
time but does seek to ensure that such appointments are announced publicly, and 
Select Committees can be expected to examine their work.
32
  
 Changes of minister 
37. Although each appointment is made by an individual minister, if he or she 
is replaced during the same government, the successor does not terminate 
the appointment. The tsar may feel that they have lost a patron and need 
to work hard to gain the support of the new minister. Sir Michael Lyons’ 
review of local government funding, which lasted from July 2004 to March 
2007 because of successive extensions, had two client departments, HMT 
and ODPM (today’s DCLG) and in the latter four ministers (Raynsford, 
Miliband, Kelly, Woolas) who exhibited varying degrees of engagement with 
his work; there was little political commitment to his recommendations 
when he reported. Otto Thoresen also had four ministers in HMT (Balls, 
Eagle, Usher, Cooper) in the fifteen months of his review on money advice 
from January 2007 to March 2008.  
38. When the Coalition succeeded Labour in 2010, tsars who were still at work 
or whose report was ready faced different fates. Some tsars’ reports that 
were already on new ministers’ desks were picked up and the new minister 
responded. This happened with Sir Peter North’s review of drink and drug 
driving (2009-10) which was completed in March 2010 and submitted 
                                       
31 Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code, May 2010, para 3.1. 
32 House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Government Responses 
to the Committee’s Eighth and Ninth Reports of Session 2009-10: Goats and Tsars: 
Ministerial and other appointments from outside Parliament and Too Many Ministers?, 
Second Report of Session 2010-11, October 2010, HC 150, paras 17ff.  
       





during the pre-election purdah to Lord Adonis, who had commissioned it. It 
was published in June 2010 and the government’s response was made in 
March 2011. 
39. Some tsars with ongoing work were formally confirmed in post: 
 Martha Lane Fox as Digital Champion, first appointed in March 2010, was 
re-appointed in June 2010. 
 Jean Gross, first appointed in January 2010 as Children’s Communication 
Champion, was reappointed, albeit on revised terms. 
 Sir Roy McNulty appointed in February 2010 to assess railway value for 
money, was confirmed by the new Secretary of State for Transport in May 
2010 and reported in May 2011. 
 Lord Browne’s review of higher education commissioned in November 2009, 
reported in October 2010 and was followed speedily by government 
proposals.  
 Gerry Grimstone’s review of the role of civilians in defence was initiated in 
December 2009 as an input to a future Labour defence review and reported 
in June 2010 for the Coalition’s defence review (see Box 1 above).  
40. Other tsars’ appointments were explicitly terminated by the new Coalition 
minister. This happened to: Jan Berry, appointed as the Reducing 
Bureaucracy in Policing Advocate in July 2008 and sacked by the new 
policing minister Nick Herbert in June 2010; by all accounts she had had a 
difficult relationship with Labour ministers.  
41. In some cases the tsar was left uncertain whether they were still in post. 
For example, Dame Stephanie Shirley was appointed by Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown as the government’s Giving and Philanthropy Ambassador in 
May 2009. After the 2010 election she received no communication from the 
new minister or the department. 
Ministers’ motives 
42. Tsars as expert advisors have many attractions to ministers. A number of 
factors explain what can make a tsar the most attractive option:  
 Tsars can work quickly, and want to do so if they have had to take 
significant time away from their main jobs. Six to twelve months is the 
most common time from appointment to report, which is usually faster than 
most advisory committees or contracted researchers or consultants. The 
fast turn-round also increases the likelihood that the minister will not have 
been reshuffled before the tsar reports. 
 Ministers believe that they will get good advice from a handpicked tsar who 
brings independent expertise (for example, from a lawyer, an economist, a 
business manager, an entrepreneur, a politician or a public servant) 
tempered by practical experience and political nous, a combination that 
would be much less likely among their officials. It may also be that tsar can 
offer advice on a new issue on which the minister, his officials and other 
advisors are poorly informed. This was clearly the case with Louise Casey’s 
appointment to advise on rough sleeping (1999).  
 Ministers may also believe that the recommendations of an independent 
expert can provide a basis for resolving differences, either between 
       





departments or between government and opposition, and help to build 
consensus around a course of action. Hence, for example, the recruitment 
of Sir Peter North to review drink and drug driving laws (2009) or Andrew 
Dilnot to review social care (2010) and, more overtly, the Coalition 
government’s appointment of Labour MPs Frank Field to review poverty and 
life chances (2010), Graham Allen on early intervention (2010), Andrew 
Milburn (a former Labour MP and minister) on social mobility (2010) and 
Lord John Hutton (also an ex Labour MP and minister) on public service 
pensions. One tsar we interviewed, not one of the above, described being 
hired to being: 
 ...the fox in the chicken coop. 
 The tsar’s own expert status and/or reputation can provide backing and 
cover for the minister’s preferences. Steve Richards commented:  
 Brown had a soft spot for bankers – one that was to prove disastrous as events 
turned out. But at the start of the century his counter intuitive close association 
with the most senior bankers in the land provided him with a layer of protective 
clothing as he started to become a little more politically daring.33 
 The tsar offers advice direct to the minister, unmediated (at least formally) 
by officials and so creates an alternative source of policy advice, exactly the 
kind of outsourcing that ministers now want to promote, according to the 
Civil Service Reform Plan.  
43. There are also more political reasons why ministers appoint tsars. 
 Sometimes the appointment and the report will provide useful publicity if 
the choice of a tsar and their work expresses desired political values, 
captures public sympathy, diverts attention, and gives the impression that 
something is being done on a pressing issue. PASC concluded that: 
 The allegation that some of these posts might have been created for the sake of a 
press notice may be unfair, but it is difficult to refute without greater 
transparency.34  
 Ministers like to exercise patronage, conferring benefit and reward (though 
usually non-monetary) on those whose values they share, whose support 
they seek or have received. This motive is very evident in the appointment 
of politicians as tsars, in particular when these are recently displaced 
ministers. One tsar of this type said in interview: 
 Having been a minister for [several] years it’s difficult to quietly slip into the back 
benches. 
Such appointments can seem like a payoff for past services rendered. This 
could explain Lord Sainsbury’s appointment (2006) to review science and 
innovation policy (which had been his ministerial responsibility in the 
preceding eight years), Richard Caborn’s appointment as Ambassador for 
the 2018 World Cup bid (2007) after being sacked as Sports Minister when 
Brown succeeded Blair as Prime Minister (see Box 1 above), and Des 
                                       
33 Steve Richards, Whatever it takes: The real story of Gordon Brown and New Labour, 
London, Fourth Estate, 2010, p 150. 
34 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Goats and Tsars; 
Ministerial and other appointments from outside Parliament, HC 33, 2010, para 101. 
       





Browne MP’s appointment as Special Envoy to Sri Lanka (2009) after being 
Secretary of State for Defence and for Scotland. Malcolm Wicks MP was 
invited to review the impact of international energy markets on UK energy 
security following his removal as energy minister in 2008. 
 
       





4 Who are the tsars? 
Demographics and diversity 
44. Taken together, the 267 tsar appointees were not diverse. Table 10, Table 
11 and Table 12 show that 85% were males, 83% were over 50 when 
appointed35 and 98% were ethnically white (whereas nearly 17% of the UK 
population is non-white).36 
85% 226 male 
15% 41 female 
Table 10 Tsars: gender 
 
83% 223 over 50 
45% 121 over 60 
   
38% 102 50-60 
13% 34 40-50 
4% 1 under 40 
Table 11 Tsars: age on appointment 
 
98% 262 white 
2% 5 African or Asian 
Table 12 Tsars: ethnicity 
45. Another notable feature is the very high prevalence of honorific titles 
among tsars at the time of appointment: 35 lords, five baronesses, 55 
knights and six dames, 101 in total, comprising 38% of all appointments.  
46. Of the five tsars with African or Asian backgrounds, four (80%) were men 
(Shaun Bailey, Prof Sube Banerjee, Richard Taylor and Lord Nat Wei) and 
one was a woman (Sunita Mason). Their age profile was quite different to 
the white tsars: three (60%) of them were under 40 (Bailey, Mason, Wei), 
one (20%) was 41-50 (Taylor) and only one (20%) was 51-60 (Banerjee); 
none were over 60.  
47. Female tsars were also younger (Table 13). Appointments of female tsars 
vary widely aiming ministers. Ministers from six departments chose no 
women at all (DCMS, DECC, DfID, DTP, FCO and MOD), whereas ministers 
in three departments appointed women for over a quarter of their tsars: 
(PM, CO, DfE). Ministers from the other eight departments appointed 
women as 10-20% of their tsars. The average was 15%. 
                                       
35 For comparison, Hennessy op cit p 557 quotes from the January 1986 list of ‘the Great 
and the Good’ (which contained over 5000 names) to reveal that 18% were women and 
95% were over 40. 
36 Office of National Statistics, estimate for England and Wales, 2009. 
       





 M M F F 
under 40 4 2% 5 12% 
40-50 27 10% 7 17% 
50-60 85 38% 16 39% 
over 60 110 49% 13 32% 
 226  41  
Table 13 Tsars: gender and age 
48. Patterns in the gender of tsars can also be seen by looking at the 
departments by policy area. While this may only be a rough indicator, as 
the clusters inevitably contain overlapping areas, we have grouped 
departments as follows: 
 economic (BIS, HMT) 
 social (DCMS, DfE, DH, DWP) 
 home (DCLG, HO, MOJ) 
 infrastructure (DECC, DEFRA, DTP) 
 foreign and security (DfID, FCO, MOD) 
 government (CO, PM) 
For women tsars Figure 2 shows clear differences between these policy area 
clusters, with a greater proportion of all women tsars appointed in the 
government, social and home policy areas.  
 
Figure 2 Women tsars by policy area 
49. These demographic findings suggest several influences. One might be a 
presumption that men and women further on in their careers may be able 
to draw on and reflect upon greater depth and/or breadth of work 
experience than younger individuals because they have more working 
experience. On the other hand, younger individuals may be more 
innovative or more open to innovative options than older individuals. 
Another telling influence may be that the bias towards white males reflects 
the ethnic and gender profiles of the professions and organisational sectors 



















       





50. These pronounced biases of gender and ethnicity run counter to the Public 
Sector Equality Duty37 and its predecessors , notwithstanding governments’ 
rhetoric over many years about securing greater diversity in their own 
ranks, the civil service and the wider public sector. Furthermore, appointing 
tsars from a more diverse pool of candidates, including more who are 
younger, female and from more ethnically diverse backgrounds could 
introduce fresh stimulus, less affinity to custom and practice and more 
robust challenge into policy making and political culture. It could make 
more sensible use of the different perspectives, creativity and imagination 
that overlooked individuals may be able to contribute. 
Career backgrounds 
51. We distinguish between tsars’ career backgrounds (which are a matter of 
record) and the particular expertise they bring to their assignments (a 
matter of judgement). Their backgrounds include their formal training and 
the work roles they have held during their careers prior to their 
appointment. We used ten categories to categorize the careers of most 
tsars (more than one may apply to a single individual):  
 business (from any commercial and industrial sector) 
 public services (serving or former officials from local government, public 
agencies, the NHS, schools, police, prisons, the armed forces, security 
services, etc) 
 research, whether in academe, consultancy or think tanks 
 political (serving or former MPs, MSPs, MEPs, peers, elected councillors, 
affiliated to any political party or none) 
 tsar previously 
 civil service (serving or former officials from Whitehall departments) 
 law (active or former solicitors, barristers, judges, academic lawyers) 
 NGO (not for profit non-statutory organisations; third sector charities) 
 media (current and former journalists, editors, producers from television, 
radio, newspapers and periodicals) 
 political party staff. 
52. Business and public sector backgrounds predominated (Table 14): business 
backgrounds were the commonest (40%), public services came next (28%) 
and together with civil service backgrounds (9%) were nearly as great as 
business (37%). Researchers , almost all from universities, very few from 
consultancies or think tanks,38 were almost a quarter of tsars (23%). 
Politicians (18%) and people working for political parties or trade unions 
(2%) were a fifth (20%). The other career backgrounds of law, NGOs and 
the media each characterised fewer than 10% of tsars. Interestingly, 10% 
of appointments went to individuals who had already had a tsar 
appointment: ‘serial tsars’ (on which more below).  
                                       
37 Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011. 
38 We found no clear explanation for the absence of tsar appointments from 
consultancies or think tanks. 
       





40% 107 business 
28% 75 public services 
23% 61 research 
18% 48 politician (10 Con 10 Lab 5 LD 5 crossbench) 
10% 28 tsar previously 
9% 23 civil service 
8% 21 law 
8% 21 NGO 
5% 13 media 
2% 7 other 
2% 6 political party staff 
 1 not known 
Table 14 Tsars: career backgrounds 
(more than one may apply to an individual) 
53. We explored whether tsars from particular backgrounds were more likely to 
work in particular areas of policy, again using the six clusters of 
departments (see para 48). Here too, more than one background can apply 
to an individual Tsar. Table 15 shows the three most frequent career 
backgrounds of tsars within each cluster, according to the percentage of 
total appointments made by the departments within the cluster.  
Policy areas Career backgrounds (top 3) 
economic business; research; public services 
social research; public services 
home business; research; political 
infrastructure business; research; public services/political 
foreign  public service; political 
government political; business; tsar previously 
Table 15 Tsars: career backgrounds in policy areas 
Figure 3-Figure 8 show the whole set for each cluster, using the key: 
1=Tsar (previously); 2=Business; 3=Public services; 4=Politician;  
5=Civil service; 6=lawyer; 7=NGO; 8=Academic/think tank;  
9=Political party; 10=Media; 11=Other 
 
       






Figure 3 Career backgrounds: economic policy (BIS, HMT) 
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Figure 6 Career backgrounds: infrastructure policy (DECC, DEFRA, DTP) 
 
 
Figure 7 Career backgrounds: foreign and security policy (DfID, FCO, MOD) 
 
 
Figure 8 Career backgrounds: government policy (CO, PM) 
Expertise 
54. We view expertise as the capabilities that tsars bring to the role, which they 
have built and developed through their education, careers and life 
experience. Expertise is about understanding relationships and 























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
       





 a high level of familiarity with a body of knowledge and/or experience that is 
neither widely shared nor simply acquired.39  
55. We identified six kinds of expertise among tsars (Table 16; again, an 
individual tsar may bring more than one kind of expertise to bear on a 
task): 
 professional (active in the field of the remit, for example regulation, 
pensions, dance) 
 business management (managerial and decision making experience in a 
business organisation, for example, as CEO or chair of a company) 
 public management (managerial and decision making expertise in a public 
sector organisation, for example, a former chief executive of an NDPB or a 
former permanent secretary) 
 analytical (applying theory, research and analysis to policy issues, for 
example, as an economist, psychologist or lawyer) 
 political (decision making expertise in a political context, for example, as an 
MP, minister or local authority member)  
 experiential (direct personal experience of the issue, for example, as the 
parent or spouse of a victim of serious crime).  
47% 125 professional  
26% 70 business management  
25% 68 analytical 
21% 56 public management  
18% 48 political  
3% 9 experiential  
Table 16 Tsars: expertise 
(more than one may apply to an individual) 
The term ‘celebrity tsar’ has been used pejoratively for some appointments. 
By ‘celebrity’ is meant that the person already has a high media profile. 
Where this was so, the person also had one of the expertises above. Their 
celebrity may raise awareness of the appointment, it does not by itself 
make them any less qualified for the task.  
56. Almost half of all tsar appointments (47%) had professional expertise in the 
issue they investigated, where the tsar was able to draw on knowledge, 
skills and working experience specifically relevant to that issue. Another 
quarter to a fifth of appointments had business management expertise 
(26%), public management expertise (21%), analytical expertise (25%) or 
political expertise (18%). Experiential expertise occurred infrequently (3%). 
57. The associations between expertise and policy fields are illuminating. 
Professional expertise, the dominant type, is strongly represented in most 
policy fields. Analytical, business and public management expertises are 
also widely found across policy fields. Political expertise is marked among 
                                       
39 Edward Page, ‘Bureaucrats and expertise: Elucidating a problematic relationship in 
three tableaux and six jurisdictions’, Sociologie du Travail, 52/2, 2010, p 258. 
       





tsars appointed to advise on foreign and security policy (FCO, DfID, MOD) 
and among those appointed by the Prime Minister or the Cabinet Office 
(Table 17).  
Policy areas Expertise (top 3) 
economic professional; business management; analytical 
social professional; analytical; public management 
home professional; public management; analytical 
infrastructure business/public management; professional; analytical 
foreign  professional; political; analytical/business management 
government political; professional; business management 
Table 17 Tsars: expertise in policy areas 
 
Figure 9-Figure 14 show the whole set for each cluster, using the key: 
1=Professional; 2=Analytical; 3=Experiential; 4=Political;  
5=Business management; 6=Public Management; 7=Other 
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Figure 10 Expertise: social policy (DCMS, DfE, DH, DWP) 
 
Figure 11 Expertise: home policy (DCLG, HO, MOJ)  
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Figure 13 Expertise: foreign and security policy (DfID, FCO, MOD) 
 
 
Figure 14 Expertise: government policy (CO, PM) 
58. This evidence on the role of expertise in tsar appointments can be 
summarised in three models of tsar expertise in relation to their remit.  
Model A: the ‘specialist’ 
59. The tsar has professional expertise, is a recognised and well-regarded 
expert in the field in which they are invited to work or has analytical 
expertise appropriate to the task and is recognised and well-regarded in 
those terms. The minister appoints this kind of tsar in the expectation that 
their advice will be informed and objective. Examples include Sir Alan Steer 
who advised on pupil behaviour in schools (2007) on the basis of his 
professional experience as a teacher and head master; the composer 
Howard Goodall appointed National Ambassador for Singing (2007), and 
Professor of Social Policy Eileen Munro appointed to review child protection 
policy (2010). Tsars with experiential expertise also fit this model, though 
their expertise may be more personal and less objective. 
Model B: the ‘generalist’  
60. The tsar, usually from a business or public services background, is 
appointed to work in a field beyond their career experience, and invited to 
apply their management expertise to the task. Ministers would expect these 
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topic; they may need professional advisory support (see below). Such an 
‘open mind’ could be judged advantageous. One tsar interviewee, who did 
not have detailed knowledge or experience of the subject of his remit, 
reported that the minister said that he would be a ‘tabula rasa’.40 Examples 
are Adair Turner on pensions (2002), David Freud on welfare (2006), both 
with City careers; Stephen Boys Smith, formerly a senior civil servant in 
the Home Office, on the coal health compensation scheme (2004) and Tom 
Winsor on police pay and conditions (2010).  
Model C: the ‘advocate’ 
61. The tsar may have known and relevant expertise, but also known views, 
having already committed themselves publicly to a particular perspective 
on the issues their remit deals with. This is likely with tsars with political 
expertise: for example, Frank Field MP had long expressed his own views 
on poverty before his appointment to review poverty and life chances 
(2010). Ex-ministers invited to be tsars in a field where they had held 
responsibility, such as Lord Sainsbury on science and technology policy 
(2007) and Lord Chris Smith on the film industry (2011), surely come to 
the task with their own well-established views. This model also includes 
tsars with all kinds of expertise who are already to some degree public 
figures. Among academic experts, for example, Professor Alison Wolf had 
been a public critic of past education policies before her appointment to 
review vocational education (2010), and Professor John Kay’s views on 
financial regulation were well-known to the minister who appointed him to 
review the performance of UK equity markets (2011). Ministers will have a 
clear expectation of what they will get from Model C tsars, who will provide 
rigorous evidence and argument to push a preferred policy forward. This 
type of tsar might fit the concept of the ‘policy entrepreneur’.41  
Tsars’ motivations 
62. Most tsar interviewees expressed surprise and were flattered to be invited 
to undertake the task. Several tsars found they had underestimated how 
much time was required to complete the work especially under tight 
deadlines. One tsar reported that he was told the task would take one day 
a week, whereas it actually took 1-2 days a week in the first year of the 
project and 2-3 days in the second year. Even with the support provided by 
the department (see para 100ff), the tsar role was a more hands-on task 
than, say, using their expertise to help ministers by chairing an advisory 
committee, responding to a consultation or contributing to a conference or 
seminar. 
63. Beyond the flattery, the three most common reasons tsars gave for 
accepting the appointment were a sense of public duty, the chance to 
influence policy, and to enhance their reputation. Public duty was seen as a 
                                       
40 The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines the Latin ‘tabula rasa’ as ‘an absence of 
preconceived ideas or predetermined goals; a clean slate.’ 
41 John Kingdon defined policy entrepreneurs as ‘people who are willing to invest 
resources of various kinds in hope of a future return in the form of policies they favour.’ 
J W Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Boston, Little Brown, 
Massachusetts, 1984, p 151. 
       





way to ‘give back’ to society and contribute their expertise to do something 
worthwhile. The opportunity to influence government policy on a topic of 
interest or to advocate a cause they supported was appealed to many 
tsars. Some felt that the experience also enhanced their CV or the 
reputation of their organisation. 
64. Tsars saw their personal reputations benefiting from the role by increasing 
their public profile and status, enhancing their ‘inside’ knowledge of 
Whitehall and widening their networks and contacts there and beyond. 
Tsars gained further recognition from their professional peers and were 
delighted when their report became known to stakeholders and in the 
media by their own name (the Grimstone Report, the Thoresen Report, 
etc). Tsars who had been ministers and senior civil servants value the 
implied recognition of their past achievements as well as the chance to 
‘keep their hand in’. Undertaking the tsar role may have contributed to 
several tsars subsequently receiving honours, such as a CBE.  
65. In some cases the tsar role has enabled the individual to take their career 
in a new direction. For example: 
 Louise Casey left Shelter, a campaigning NGO, to become the 
‘Homelessness tsar’ (1999), which led to her becoming a permanent civil 
servant. Thereafter she has had a succession of high profile assignments on 
anti-social behaviour, victims and troubled families.  
 Peter Gershon, with an earlier career in the telecommunications and 
electronics businesses, reviewed civil procurement (1998) and 
recommended the creation of a new Office of Government Commerce; he 
was appointed its first CEO.  
 Banker David Freud, following his review of the benefits system for the 
Labour administration (2006), became an adviser to the Conservative 
Opposition, a Conservative peer and Coalition minister in DWP. 
 Tom Winsor, having reviewed police pay and conditions (2010), was 
appointed Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, the first time someone 
other than a police officer had been given the role. 
 Sir Ronald Cohen and Nick O’Donohoe from the world of venture capital 
were commissioned to do a feasibility study for a Big Society Bank (2011), 
which would claim unused cash in bank accounts to invest in social 
enterprises; they were then appointed Chairman and Chief Executive of the 
bank, renamed Big Society Capital. 
66.  Many tsars, on completion of their work, moved on with their main career 
or other activities and regarded their connection with the topic as ended. In 
other cases tsars chose to continue as a spokesperson or advocate for their 
recommendations - becoming a ‘policy entrepreneur’, in effect, – after their 
tsar appointment was over. For example: 
 Derek Wanless, who reviewed NHS funding (2001) and public health 
policies (2003) went on to lead two reviews for the independent King’s 
Fund on social care for older people and on NHS funding and performance. 
 Dame Stephanie Shirley, appointed Giving and Philanthropy Ambassador 
(2009), established a new, private, worldwide Ambassadors for 
Philanthropy organisation. 
       





 Dame Joan Bakewell, the Voice of Older People (2008), continued to write 
and speak on the concerns of older people as a journalist and broadcaster 
and in the House of Lords. 
 Baroness Helen Newlove, Champion for Active, Safer Communities (2010) 
became co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the victims and 
witnesses of crime as well as having an advisory role in DCLG, which 
continued to publish progress reports on her tsar recommendations.  
 Mary Portas reviewed the future of the high street (2012) and went on to 
act as an adviser to DCLG when they launched a competition for 
demonstration projects called ‘Portas pilots’. She visits and advises the 
towns on their proposals and is making a series of TV programmes on the 
subject. 
67. A few tsars did not complete their work. Two per cent of appointments 
ended when the minister dismissed the tsar or the tsar resigned. It appears 
that the tsar’s behaviour or expressed views embarrassed the government 
or the tsar found the government’s behaviour or expressed views 
unreceptive to their efforts. For example:  
 Keith Hellawell, the Anti-drugs Coordinator (1998), resigned after four 
years of often contentious relations with ministers. 
 Lord Anthony Lester, the independent adviser to the Justice Secretary on 
certain aspects of constitutional reform (2007), quit over a row with Jack 
Straw, expressing his discontent with ‘the Government's current proposals 
for a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, and with some aspects of its 
proposals for constitutional reform.’42  
 Gordon Brown appointed Richard Taylor, whose son Damilola was 
murdered, Special Envoy on youth violence and knife crime (2009). He 
resigned after a year stating publicly: 
 ...it turned out that my appointment was just media propaganda and that they 
were more interested in the election than finding solutions.43  
 Dame Joan Bakewell, appointed as the Voice of Older People (2008), 
resigned arguing for the creation of a statutory, full time Old Person’s 
Commissioner as in Wales and Northern Ireland.  
 Lord Wei, government adviser on the Big Society (2010), initially reduced 
his commitment to two days per week then resigned because of the 
pressure from his other work commitments. 
 Lord Young was appointed Enterprise Champion by David Cameron in 
November 2010 and resigned less than three weeks later after his remark 
in a Daily Telegraph interview that people had ‘never had it so good’ as a 
result of low interest rates caused offence.44 He was re-appointed a year 
later. 
                                       
42 Daily Telegraph, 5 November 2008. 
43 Daily Telegraph, 5 March 2010. 
44 Daily Telegraph, 18 November 2010. 
       





 Emma Harrison resigned as Families Champion (2010-12) following 
allegations of corruption in her welfare to work business A4e. 
Remuneration 
68. Departments usually do not voluntarily disclose to the public domain 
whether tsars are paid in fees or expenses: that non-disclosure applied to 
over three quarters (77%) of tsar appointments. For some tsars who were 
unpaid, that fact was included in the announcement of the appointment. 
Very occasionally MPs have asked parliamentary questions to make 
ministers say what named tsars were paid. On 1 March 2007 Mark Francois 
MP asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much each of 31 tsars were 
paid, whom the Treasury had appointed to undertake reviews since 1999. A 
junior minister gave a brief generic reply about reimbursement of 
reasonable expenses, adding:  
 ...Occasionally, where a reviewer is asked to undertake especially extensive work, 
remuneration can be provided.45  
He limited his specific reply, on grounds of cost, to tsars appointed in the 
previous two years, naming four who had been paid fees although not 
stating the amounts.  
69. Freedom of Information requests were submitted to several departments to 
discover more of the facts. The findings are presented in Annex 3.1. 
Aggregating that information with details obtained in interviews with tsars 
and information in the public domain, allows only for speculation on the 
overall picture because so many departments withhold this information. 
Our speculations may be inaccurate.  
70. With that caution in mind, we estimate that it is likely that nearly half 
(47%) of tsars are paid, just over a third (35%) negotiate a fee (which may 
go to their main employer) and expenses, and almost a fifth (18%) receive 
expenses only (Table 18).  
 Paid (%) Not paid (%) 
Fees 47 53 
Expenses 53 47 
   
Fees and expenses 35 - 
Expenses only 18 - 
No fees or expenses 47 - 
Table 18 Tsars: remuneration (estimate) 
71. Of those who were paid a fee, that fee reflected their current employment 
status. Broadly speaking, if they were employees, their employer was 
reimbursed for the equivalent of their salary plus overheads. If they were 
self-employed consultants also working for other clients their tsar rate was 
related to their usual consultancy rate. If they were retired former civil or 
public servants their fee could be related to the department’s rate for board 
or panel members.  
                                       
45 Hansard, House of Commons, 1 March 2007, col 1480W. 
       





72. In interviews tsars explained why they did not seek or not accept payment 
or why they did not regard it as strange not to be offered payment. Some 
said payment would be ‘inappropriate’; others said it was irrelevant to their 
decision or their readiness to do their best for the minister. Some said the 
rate they had been offered was so much lower than they could earn from 
their other work that it seemed pointless to bother with it. One tsar who 
negotiated a comparatively high fee to match their consultancy rate 
justified the amount in terms of compensation for the perceived 
professional and financial risk consequent on becoming unavailable for 
other consultancy during their tenure as a tsar, while simultaneously 
needing to maintain private pension contributions.  
73. The actual amounts paid to tsars or their employers also depends on the 
duration of the appointment and the proportion of time the tsar allocates to 
the appointment. The highest rate we found was £220,000 per annum for a 
full time appointment (Table 19). Part time appointments for relatively 
large assignments could generate total payments up to £100,000, including 
overheads.  
77% 206 not known 
11% 30  unpaid 
7% 19  expenses only 
5% 13  Fee paid to tsar or employers 
 6  £500-1,000 per day 
 3  £100,000 - £220,000 pa 
 1  already paid £25,000 pa by the department for his other roles for it 
 1  performance related pay 
 2  tsars declined to disclose amount paid 
Table 19 Tsars: remuneration amounts  
 
       





5 What were the tsars’ remits? 
Titles 
74. There were 13 different titles for tsars among the 267 appointments (Table 
20). By far the most common was ‘Reviewer’ (187 or 70%), or 
‘Independent Reviewer.’ All other titles were used in 5% or fewer cases. 
The choice of title was seemingly not always well-considered and cannot be 
regarded as indicative of the nature of the task.  
75. Occasionally the title was misleading, as for example when Malcolm Wicks 
MP was appointed to undertake a review of international energy and was 
entitled Special Representative (2008) and when Sir Peter Hall and Chris 
Green were called Station Champions (2009) although their remit involved 
a review. 
70% 187 reviewer 
5% 14 adviser  
5% 13 champion 
5% 13 (special) representative 
4% 12 chair (of commission, inquiry, panel, etc) 
2% 6 ambassador 
2% 5 (special) envoy 
 4 commissioner 
 2 advocate 
 2 coordinator 
 1 voice 
 1 audit 
 1 scrutiny 
Table 20 Tsars: titles 
76. Some titles seem intended to convey status rather than remit. For example, 
the titles Representative, Envoy, or Ambassador were often given to MPs or 
former ministers. The prefixes ‘Government’s…’ or ‘Prime Minister’s…’ or 
‘Special…’ provided added kudos. Tsars themselves occasionally had a say 
in the choice of title. Sir Digby Jones, recruited to promote the response to 
the Leitch review on skills (2004), reported that: 
 Gordon Brown said, “I really don't mind what you're called: champion, envoy, 
ambassador.” I chose envoy. 
In an interview Dame Joan Bakewell told us that she had rejected the 
suggested titles of Ambassador (too authoritative) and Champion (too 
sporty) and suggested she be called the ‘Voice of Older People’ because she 
thought it best expressed her role to articulate the concerns of older people 
and her expertise as a broadcaster and writer.  
       





Types of remit 
77. Tsars’ terms of reference and modes of working can be clustered into three 
types, which we label ’review’, ‘represent’ and ’promote’ (Table 21):  
 The majority, just over four fifths (83%) of the tsar appointments had a 
remit to review a policy question and make recommendations to the 
minister, for example, on housing supply (Kate Barker, 2003), airport 
security (Stephen Boys Smith, 2005), on civilians in defence (Gerry 
Grimstone, 2009; see Box 1 above).  
 Just under a tenth (9%) had a remit to represent to government the 
interests and concerns of particular groups within the population, for 
example, children (Children’s Commissioners Al Aynsley Green, 2005-9 and 
Maggie Atkinson, 2010-), older people (Dame Joan Bakewell, 2008), active, 
safer communities (Baroness Newlove, 2010; see Box 1 above). 
 Just under a tenth (8%) had a remit to promote the uptake and 
application of government policy, for example, on dignity in care (Sir 
Michael Parkinson, 2008), dance (Wayne MacGregor, 2008), England’s bid 
for the 2018 football World Cup (Richard Caborn MP, 2007; see Box 
1above), university access (Simon Hughes MP, 2011). 
83% 221 review  
9% 24 represent  
8% 22 promote  
Table 21 Tsars: remits 
78. All three remits are about providing advice to ministers on aspects of 
policy, and are consistent with our definition of a tsar (see para 3 above). 
These are distinct remits with certain elements in common. An individual 
appointment may involve elements of more than one type. For example, a 
review often involves understanding the interests and concerns of those 
with a stake in that policy issue; remits to represent and promote 
sometimes involves some reviewing in order to understand, though not to 
challenge, current policy. The composite remits of some tsar appointments 
is well illustrated by MoD’s recent announcement of the appointment of 
Lord Ashcroft as Special Representative for Veteran’s Transition (our use of 
bold): 
 The Prime Minister has appointed Lord Ashcroft KCMG as his Special 
Representative for Veterans' Transition, working with all government 
departments to ensure military personnel get the support they need when making 
the transition to civilian life. Lord Ashcroft will carry out a review and take a fresh 
look at the advice and support package currently in place for personnel leaving the 
Armed Forces… Lord Ashcroft's work will champion the cause of servicemen and 
women making the transition to civilian life, liaising with Armed Forces charities, 
industry and across departmental boundaries to support access to employment and 
the package available for those transitioning into civilian life.46 




       





79. Tsars’ advice can be related to the familiar concept of the policy cycle 
(Figure 15), which identifies a sequence in which a real world change 
becomes recognised as a problem, policy options for addressing it are 
developed, one option is chosen and then delivered to impact the real 
world. In practice this simple progression may not proceed tidily, it may be 
halted at any stage if change is not recognised politically, or is 
misdiagnosed, or if only limited policy options are considered or a bad 
policy choice is made, or where delivery falters, or if the impact is 
negligible.  
 
Figure 15 Policy cycle 
80. Tsars’ advice can be taken up at any stage in the cycle. Represent remits 
often contribute at the understanding change/problem definition stages of 
the cycle. Reviewers’ advice tends to come in at the defining 
problem/developing option stage. Promote remits are sometimes most 
salient at the delivery stage.  
81. The use of these three remits varied between policy areas. Reviews were 
the most common choice in all policy areas, while represent and promote 
remits were found more selectively. Tsars who had represent remits were 
mostly appointed in the areas we labelled government (Prime Minister and 
CO), social policy (DCMS, DfE, DH, DWP), home (DCLG, HO, MOJ) and 
infrastructure (DECC, DEFRA, DTP). Tsars with promote remits47 were 
mainly appointed in foreign and security and infrastructure.  
The variety of remits 
82. The topics addressed by tsars have been extremely diverse. They include:  
 broad strategy (for example, on health, social care, skills, philanthropy); 
 narrower, more operational issues (airport policing, money advice, support 
to museums); 
 persistent, even perennial, policy concerns (such as pensions, the decline of 
high streets, health and safety, university-business collaboration);  
                                       













       





 topical concerns, often prompted by particular external events or 
controversies (Christmas savings schemes, the use of restraint in juvenile 
detention, adoption, transport resilience in winter, rail franchising); 
 topics clearly related to stated government priorities (public sector 
pensions, social mobility, the economics of climate change);  
 issues that particularly interest an individual minister (such as railway 
station standards, gifted and talented children, early intervention); 
 issues that require specialist professional advice (such as drink and drug 
driving law, work capability assessment, Post Office mutualisation, tax 
avoidance, crime statistics); and 
 aspirational matters (such as more women on business boards, cultural 
education, access to the professions). 
Some topics were revisited by a fresh tsar quite quickly, notably school 
behaviour, which has had two tsar reviews in five years, and dance, which 
has had three in four years, albeit with slightly different tasks. 
Tsars versus other sources of external expert advice 
83. Are there topics that ministers find particularly suitable for a tsar 
appointment, rather than drawing on the other sources of external advice 
(mentioned in para 7 above), such as referring the matter to an advisory 
committee, appointing researchers or consultants, holding a seminar or 
conference? It is hard to answer this question given the broad range of 
topics that tsars have been invited to address. Nevertheless, there are 
fields or topics that tsars seem to be kept away from. Tsars are relatively 
uncommon in the foreign policy, international development and security 
policy areas. They are also almost totally absent for topics that required 
expertise in the physical and life sciences, where of course external 
expertise is used extensively. Such matters are commonly addressed 
through expert scientific committees. The exceptions were where tsars 
were appointed to investigate the policy implications of incidents where 
major threats to animal and human had health occurred, including the two 
most recent foot and mouth disease epidemics and the swine flu outbreak.  
84. Tsars have also been appointed to address topics that might appear at first 
to be more suitable for expert advice from other sources. Some tsars seem 
to be asked to provide straightforward professional or consultancy advice, 
where they are the known expert in the field. In specialist aspects of the 
law, for example, lawyers were appointed to advise on the statutory regime 
for issuer liability (Professor Paul Davies QC, 2006) and a general anti (tax) 
avoidance rule (Graham Aaronson QC, 2010). Similarly in medical science, 
there are a few examples of tsar appointments to provide professional 
advice on such matters as the use of anti-psychotic drugs for dementia 
(Professor Sube Banerjee, 2009) and controls on infant formula and follow-
on formula (Professor Anne Murcott, 2009).  
85. Other examples relate to topics that might have been pursued through 
research or consultancy commissions rather than a tsar appointment, such 
as advice on criminality information management (Sunita Mason, 2009), on 
the risks to children from internet and video games (Dr Tanya Byron, 2007 
and 2009), on work capability assessment (Professor Malcolm Harrington, 
       





2010, 2011), and on high street rejuvenation (Mary Portas, 2011).48 Where 
these tsars are the leading experts in their field, their appointment has the 
features of a single tender procurement of consultancy or research, which 
bypasses the procedures for competitive tendering that normally govern 
procurement. In these instances, choosing to appoint a tsar rather than 
using another source of external advice, can seem to be a way of securing 
expert advice ‘on the cheap’. Nevertheless, tsar interviewees whose advice 
might have been secured by competitive procurement of consultancy or 
research were adamant that they would not have responded to an 
invitation to tender; it was the personal invitation, the relative privacy of 
the appointment process and the minister’s imprimatur that were 
persuasive.49  
 
                                       
48 Mary Portas’ website describes her as ‘London's leading retail marketing consultant.’ 
49 When, a few years ago, the appointment of members of public boards was reformed to 
introduce open competition, many commentators argued that the consequence would be 
the unwillingness of suitable potential appointees to submit to such a process and a 
consequent dilution of the standard of appointments. This is now generally accepted not 
to have been the outcome. 
       





6 What working methods do tsars adopt? 
Terms of reference 
86. Terms of reference for tsar remits are important so that the tsar and the 
minister can be held to account for the ‘contract’ that they have agreed. 
The Cabinet Manual’s section on Public Appointments states:  
 The specific responsibilities of individual public appointees should be set out in 
letters of appointment and in related documents.50  
Nevertheless, there was no standard practice on this for tsars. Press notices 
issued by departments when a tsar’s appointment was announced and 
some tsars’ published reports revealed a variety of approaches to terms of 
reference, and we obtained further details in interviews. Some tsars were 
offered explicit and detailed terms of reference proposed by the 
department, perhaps negotiated them in detail, and may then have 
received a letter of appointment. Much more often, however, it seems that 
the minister or department regarded an oral understanding with the tsar as 
sufficient and appropriate expression of their respective responsibilities. 
One tsar told us: 
 You have to realise that when you take this work on you are making a bargain as 
an independent advisor. You get to work on an interesting topic, you have access 
to analytical support, and you can say what you like. But your report can just go on 
the shelf. Ministers can ignore it. Or they can write a foreword. 
87. Evidence of agreement on the working methods the tsar would adopt were 
rare. Most tsars interviewed said they were not asked in advance to say in 
much detail, if at all, how they envisaged undertaking their task. In 
addition, most tsars were offered very little (if any) guidance about how to 
carry out their task. One civil servant interviewee said:  
 I didn’t give him [the tsar] a detailed steer. He didn’t need it. He…knew how to do 
these things.  
The presumption seemed to be that the tsar would know how to go about 
the task and did not need to declare the steps that they would undertake. 
Some tsars did devise and issue their proposed work plan while others just 
set about the work in an apparently less planned or structured way. 
Another interviewee, an external expert advising the tsar, speaking about 
how the methodology was chosen, said:  
 To be frank, I’m not really sure. It just sort of came together through our weekly 
meetings under the project manager and occasionally [the tsar].  
However, one minister we interviewed claimed to always give his tsars 
some advice:  
 Remember it’s your report and you must be happy with it; have an advisory panel 
as a sounding board; avoid expressing views in public too early; have an open call 
for evidence; produce an interim report for consultation; and talk through your 
advice with the minister and officials before finalising the report.  
He admitted that not all his tsars took this advice. 
                                       
50 The Cabinet Manual, 2011, para 7.21. 
       





88. There was a consistent imprecision in planning and agreeing a methodology 
despite the wide range of skills the tsars possessed. Professionals, including 
academics and lawyers, whose training and experience embraced methods 
of gathering and analysing evidence to reach judgements, did know how to 
design a methodology and go about the work. Others, from business or 
public service or politics, for example, may not have had a similar depth of 
experience or extent of formal training or even done that kind of analytical 
work before or worked in a government milieu. Nor did the civil servants 
supporting the tsars whom we interviewed seem to have given much 
thought to the choice of methodology. They said that they approached this 
assignment much as they would their other departmental work, or they just 
got stuck in.  
89. This contrasts starkly with usual practice when procuring expert 
consultancy or research through open competition. There the client’s 
requirement is specified in some detail in an Invitation to Tender and the 
bidder’s proposed approach and work programme have to be set out in 
some detail and are decisive in the client’s assessment of their tender. Tsar 
appointments frequently invite the candidate to undertake a task that is 
only described in rather broad terms. 
90. Tsars with review remits often had the word ‘independent’ attached to their 
formal title. All the tsars we interviewed felt that this promise was 
honoured, and that they were relatively free to go about the work in their 
own way, talk to whoever they liked, float whatever ideas they fancied. The 
savvier tsars recognised the need to build and maintain good relations with 
their ministerial and departmental clients if their arguments and advice 
were to carry weight. They produced progress reports, briefed senior 
officials and ministers (and even shadow ministers when elections loomed) 
in order to test reactions to their emerging proposals. One tsar interviewee 
summed up these consultations thus: 
 I was challenged, but never directed. 
Durations 
91.  Most tsars were given specific deadlines to meet, others although some 
had more open-ended assignments. Table 22 shows that the majority 
(70%) completed their work within a year, of which 20% took under six 
months and 50% took between six and twelve months. Just over a quarter 
(28%) took more than a year. 
20% 55 under 6 months 
50% 134 6-12 months 
70% 189 up to 12 months 
28% 76 over 12 months 
   
6% 14 extended 
2% 6 reduced  
 2 not known 
Table 22 Durations of tsars’ work 
       





92. However, the overall totals conceal an important trend that emerged when 
we analysed the durations of tsars’ assignments for each of the 
governments since 1997. This demonstrates that the duration of tsars’ 
work has been getting shorter. Under each of the three Labour and the 
Coalition governments the percentage of assignments taking less than 6 
months has clearly been increasing (the left hand column of each group in 
Figure 16). Overall this is more than a fourfold rise, from 7% to 31%, while 
those taking between 6 and 12 months has fallen from 57% to 47%, as has 
those needing more than 12 months, from 36% to 22%. 
93. Some large-scope remits were completed in remarkably short periods of 
time: Sir Philip Green’s review of the efficiency of government spending 
(2011) may hold the record at two months. Fourteen tsars had their terms 
extended, usually to accommodate new questions or lines of enquiry: for 
example, Sir Michael Lyons’ review of local government finance (2004) was 
extended several times by ministers to widen the brief, and took three 
years in all. Prince Charles’ appointment as NHS Hospital Design Champion 
(2001) has never formally been ended (see Annex 3.2).  
 
Figure 16 Duration of tsars’ appointments 
Methods 
94. Each tsar adopted a mix of methods to gather evidence, including one or 
more of the following: 
 Open calls for evidence, usually issued early on, which also publicised the 
project, helped to identify stakeholders and bought some time to get 
organised for the rest of the work 
 Research, undertaken by the project team or by analytical staff in the client 
department or commissioned externally  
 Surveys of stakeholders’ views 
 Reviews of existing published evidence on the topic, though this was rarely 
done even when the topic was one of long standing which had been 












       





 Relevant work by previous tsars, though they were not always made aware 
of their predecessors. 
 Private discussions with key individuals or organisations 
 Visits, to see practical work in situ or meet local experts, sometimes 
overseas. 
 Consultative meetings with stakeholders and departments, most often 
private, occasionally in public. 
 Consultation documents, sometimes an Interim Report would be used in 
this way too. 
 Seminars and workshops with experts. 
 Media interviews and speeches, to raise awareness, invite contributions, 
float ideas, this very dependent on the personal inclination of the tsar. 
The ways tsars brought together their chosen sources of evidence, analysed 
the information and reached conclusions show two patterns: open versus 
closed approaches and broad versus narrow approaches. The adopted 
approach might be justified as appropriate to the remit, but in reality the 
choices depended mostly on the tsar’s personal style. For example:  
 Sir Michael Parkinson, in his role as National Dignity Ambassador (2008), 
acted as a figurehead for a government campaign to raise awareness of the 
quality of care in old people’s homes; he often accompanied a minister on 
visits. 
 Jean Gross as Children’s Communication Champion (2009) made most of 
her discussions with local authorities and agencies away from the 
ministerial spotlight. 
95. Tsars taking the open approach used one or more of the following 
methods: publicising their workplan; inviting outsiders to offer evidence or 
opinions; publishing reports of meetings and visits; writing newsletters and 
blogs; arranging media coverage; as well as publishing working papers, 
research studies and interim reports. Tsars with an open approach often 
used websites to publicise their work and invite participation; these were 
established either specially for the assignment or included as pages on the 
client department’s website. For example: 
 Alan Wood set up an independent website for his review of European public 
procurement (2003-4) from which consultation documents could be 
obtained. 
 Martha Lane Fox created a blog for progress updates and discussion for her 
digital inclusion campaign (2010-). 
 Baroness Newlove used the website of her charity Newlove Warrington to 
communicate her work as Champion for active, safer communities (2010-
11; see Box 1 above). 
96. Tsars adopting a closed approach did not declare their workplan, and little 
was known of their activities except by those directly involved until they 
revealed more in their published report, if there was one. Examples of the 
closed approach include: 
       





 Reviews of airport security by Sir John Wheeler (2002) and of airport 
policing by Stephen Boys Smith (2005). Neither report was published 
though the ministers made statements of their decisions based upon them. 
 Brian Pomeroy’s review of Christmas savings schemes (2006) based on 
private discussions with credit, retailing and consumer interests. 
 Richard Handover’s review of school financial management (2008-9); his 
appointment was not announced officially and his report, of which only five 
copies were printed, was not published and FOI requests for it were 
rejected, though it was later leaked to the BBC. 
 Lord Michael Ashcroft’s unpublished review of the future of military bases 
on Cyprus (2011) on which the minister announced a decision while only 
referring to an unnamed ‘study’. 
97. In some cases reasons of security or confidentiality may have justified 
restrictions on publishing information. But, those cases aside, it seems 
perverse to make a public appointment and then not give stakeholders an 
opportunity to know what the tsar is up to or to contribute in some way, 
even if only through the opportunity of responding to an interim report. 
Engaging stakeholders in analysing and designing policies is a well-
established way to improve the chances of finding better outcomes.51 If 
ministers’ ambition is to open up policy making and involve external 
expertise more, then an open approach by tsars should surely be the 
default practice.  
98. The other distinction between a broad and a narrow approach concerns how 
widely the tsar casts the net in gathering evidence, initiating discussion and 
debate on the issue, commissioning original research and analysis, 
examining foreign practice, and engaging with diverse viewpoints and 
experiences. Choosing the broad approach may reflect the topic itself, 
when it addresses wide-ranging matters of public policy, although it was 
also chosen by tsars with narrower remits. The approach uses an inductive 
methodology, gathering diverse evidence and looking for generalisations 
that lead to conclusions. Examples of the broad approach are:  
 The Leitch review on skills (2004), which included in its workplan a call for 
evidence, commissioned research, analysis of existing data, consultations, 
home and overseas visits and an interim report issued for comment; its 
final report ran to 154 pages.  
 Otto Thoresen, appointed to advise on developing a national approach to 
money advice (2007), estimated the need, interviewed potential clients, 
examined foreign practice, explored possible regulatory frameworks, and 
analysed the costs and benefits of his preferred approach 
 Dame Joan Bakewell, appointed the Voice of Older People (2008), initiated 
an active programme of discussions, public speaking, visits, 
                                       
51 The Institute for Government has argued that ‘responsive external engagement’ is a 
fundamental of good policy making. Michael Hallsworth and Jill Rutter, Making Policy 
Better: Improving Whitehall’s core business, London, Institute for Government, undated. 
p 8. 
       





correspondence, journalism and radio and TV appearances, responding to 
the many overtures that she received. 
99. In contrast, the narrow approach is typical of deductive reasoning, in 
which the tsar relied less on evidence gathering as the point of departure; 
rather they identified ‘hypotheses’ (or more prosaically ‘hunches’) about the 
topic and developed and tested them using a smaller, more focused 
selection of evidence sources. This tended to occur where tsars had 
professional expertise, such as lawyers, economists, educationalists or 
choreographers. In effect they had been commissioned to provide a 
professional opinion. Other tsars may have kept their approach narrow by 
drawing exclusively on their personal experience and contacts in, say, 
business, public service, the arts or the media. Examples of this narrow 
approach are : 
 Sir Nicholas Goodison’s review of support to museums and galleries for 
acquisitions (2003), which was largely informed by the views of an hoc 
group of lawyers, curators and other interested bodies, including a former 
director of Christie's auction house. 
 The Stern Review of the economics of climate change (2005) undertaken 
with the assistance of a team of economists and academic consultants. 
 Professor Paul Davies QC’s review of the statutory regime for issuer liability 
for false or misleading statements in financial markets (2006) or Graham 
Aaronson QC’s work on a general anti-avoidance rule in tax matters (2010). 
When this narrow approach seems appropriate, then that should be the 
deliberate choice of the minister and expressed in the remit, rather than 
just the predilection of the tsar. 
Assistance 
100. Tsars are always appointed as individuals and ministers look to them for 
individual advice. Nevertheless they always need assistance. Almost all 
tsars worked part-time at their task and had to coordinate that role with 
their other work commitments. The public record is not very forthcoming 
about the detail of their assistance. The main source is reports, where tsars 
often acknowledge the help they have had from civil servants and 
sometimes from others. However, this does not consistently give 
information about the identities and roles or affiliations of the individuals 
providing the assistance or the explain the nature and content of that 
assistance.  
101. Tsars’ need for and use of assistance depended largely on the role they 
choose for themselves in the project. The tsars we interviewed used 
analogous terms such as ‘team leader’, ’research director’, ‘executive 
director’. They were indicating that they provided direction for the project 
while others in the team did the leg work; and that they would be 
personally responsible for its conclusions and recommendations even 
though others had been, in many cases, the hands-on analysts and drafted 
the report.  
102. Tsar interviewees largely praised the officials seconded to assist them, 
finding them loyal and efficient, though ‘still very much a civil servant’ in 
the words of one tsar. None felt that the officials were there as the 
       





department’s minders. The officials interviewed also clearly enjoyed the 
change from their usual departmental roles, though some found 
subsequent re-entry into the mainstream problematic. One or two used the 
experience subsequently to shift to a career outside the civil service, 
sometimes in the field of the tsar’s work. 
103. We have identified three kinds of assistance to tsars: advisory, analytical 
and administrative. These are based on what was said in announcements, 
on tsars’ and departments’ websites or acknowledged in reports, together 
with our interviews. The public sources rarely made clear whether the tsar 
or the department decided whether or how much support the tsar needed, 
who would provide it or how it would be organised. Interviews revealed that 
departments often took the initiative in suggesting what type of support 
might be needed and often lined up the individuals to provide it. Usually the 
tsar gratefully accepted the offer, although some tsars negotiated the 
details, for example by declining to work with a formal advisory group, 
insisting on taking part in the selection of support staff, or bringing in 
assistants, or choosing their own external experts.  
Advisory support 
104. Although a number of tsars seemed to rely solely on their own expertise, 
far more took advice from others. Two forms of advisory support recur. 
Some tsars had a few, often two, of these advisors to provide them with 
complementary expertise. For example: 
 Sir Nigel Shadbolt as Information Adviser (2009), concerned with 
increasing access to government data, was himself advised by Tim Berners-
Lee. 
 Dame Carol Black, from a career in healthcare, worked with David Frost, a 
former Director General of the British Chamber of Commerce, on a review 
of the cost of sickness absence (2011). 
 Tom Winsor, lawyer and ex-rail regulator, was advised in his review of 
police pay and conditions (2010) by Professor Richard Disney (a labour 
market economist) and Sir Edward Crew (former Chief Constable of West 
Midlands Police).  
In such cases the named tsar was primus inter pares and the author of the 
advice to the minister. 
For many other tsars support was provided through a larger advisory group 
whose members were less closely engaged in the work and served more as 
a sounding board for emerging findings and recommendations. Again the 
tsar was the final source of advice to the minister that may or may not 
have been approved, possibly not even seen in advance, by advisory group 
members. Examples include: 
 Sir Alan Wood was supported by a Steering Group of business and trade 
union representatives and senior civil servants in his review of European 
public procurement (2003); 
 Sir John Pattison was supported by an Advisory Panel of scientists and 
medical experts in formulating a ten year vision for UK stem cell research 
(2005); 
       





 Sir James Crosby reviewed identity management (2006) as Chair of a 
Public Private Forum;  
 Lord Davies carried out a review of women on company boards (2010) 
supported by a steering group drawn from the business world and 
academia; 
 Reg Bailey’s review of the commercialisation and sexualisation of children 
(2010) drew on the assistance of a group of ‘critical friends’ who offered 
expertise and challenge. 
Sometimes such advisory groups and their members were proposed by the 
minister or department, sometimes selected by the tsar. If a tsar did not 
want such support the department did not usually insist. 
Analytical support 
105. Some tsars needed new research to inform their work, for example through 
surveys or modelling. Some needed secondary analysis of existing data or 
reviews of evidence on the topic. They could create a team of analysts for 
this, either recruited themselves or seconded from departments, and/or 
they could commission work from analysts in the departments and/or 
externally. Any such departmental analytical support was not usually costed 
separately. External analytical support also might not be costed separately 
if the work could be accounted for as a part of the department’s existing 
consultancy budget; or it might need to be a separate commission for 
which a budget line had to be allocated. When these arrangements were 
not available, the tsar had to have some special ad hoc arrangements or go 
without. Examples of analytical support included: 
 Derek Wanless commissioned two studies (one by European Observatory on 
Healthcare Systems and the other by York Health Economics Consortium) 
which contributed to his findings on population health (2003). 
 a team of professionals from HMT, DfES and the Sector Skills Development 
Agency was recruited to support Lord Leitch’s review of the UK’s long term 
skill needs (2004); some external research was commissioned, managed 
and funded by the latter agency. 
 Professor John Hills hired academic colleagues at his own university 
research centre to assist him in his review of fuel poverty policy (2011). 
Administrative support 
106. Tsars need assistance with administrative tasks such as arranging 
meetings, handling correspondence and maybe drafting papers. In most 
cases an official from the client department, usually at Grade 6 or 7, was 
assigned to the tsar to provide this support, acting as project manager; 
occasionally the tsar brought someone from their own organisation into this 
role, and the organisation probably had to pay for that; in some cases a 
tsar was helped to recruit an outsider to this role.  
Contact with ministers and senior officials 
107. All tsars realised that they had been personally chosen by that minister and 
would in due course report to that minister (unless a ministerial reshuffle 
intervened). They therefore had a strong sense of the minister as their 
client. The degree of responsiveness of officials and of ministers varied. 
       





Sometimes a senior official in the department acted for the minister, 
wanting to be kept informed about progress and how the tsar’s thinking 
was developing, occasionally providing a steer. For other tsars the senior 
officials seemed disinterested, the tsar found them difficult to engage with 
the project, at least until a draft report was produced. Similarly with 
ministers. The more savvy among the tsars recognised the need to get the 
minister on side with their conclusions and advice. They adopted a number 
of tactics to achieve that. The following quotes are from three different 
tsars. 
 I thought that if I take this on, then I have to have a conversation with the 
Secretary of State, so I know that these are things he has the remotest chance of 
doing ... I very strongly asked for that contact and I got it … I met him probably 
about three times. 
 I kept [the minister] informed. Every couple of months I rang him up and went to 
his office in the evening and we shared a bottle of Burgundy, or he would call me 
and say ‘I’ve got a bit of time now, can you come over?’  
 I was worried at the first meeting with [a new minister after a reshuffle] in case 
she did not support the proposals, although by then I was not afraid of ministers 
and I knew we had a good story to tell …The meeting did go well. 
Value for money 
108. It is impossible to judge the value for money of tsars as a source of expert 
advice, as neither side of the equation, value or money, is recorded. Some 
aspects of a tsar’s activities require direct payments, notably if the tsar is 
being paid a fee and expenses (see para 68ff) and the cost of 
commissioning external research or consultancy. All other costs, including 
civil servant staff time, travel and subsistence, office costs, venue hire and 
catering, printing and publishing and websites, are borne somewhere within 
the client department’s budgets and probably not separately identified. It is 
clear that monetary cost was not a deciding factor for ministers or officials 
for the great majority of tsar appointments, and they could not say with 
any accuracy what the work had cost.52 To find that out they would have to 
get an accountant to unpick the department’s accounts to trace every piece 
of expenditure attributable to the tsar’s work.  
109. To assess the value side of a value for money judgement there would need 
to be formal performance reviews of the work of tsars. Ministers and 
officials did have views about how useful a particular tsar had been. 
Obvious indicators that a tsar’s activities or recommendations had proved 
unacceptable were when the tsar was sacked or was not reappointed after 
a change of government, or if a minister made no formal response to the 
tsar’s work. On the other hand, 12% of individual tsars have been 
appointed more than once to different remits, the ‘repeat business’ 
endorsement. 
110. The work of tsars, as one means of bringing outside expertise to bear on 
policy, is not subject to rigorous critique or evaluation.53 There is no formal 
                                       
52 As a rough indicator, the fee for a tsar working 2.5 days per week for eight months 
(35 weeks) for an equivalent of £750 per day would be £65,625. 
53 There has also been little external critique of the work of tsars. One exception is the 
Institute of Government’s assessment that the Turner Pensions Commission was an 
       





quality assurance process for individual tsars advice: the personal 
appointment by a minister and, probably more importantly, the direct 
relationship with and reporting to the minister, seem to preclude any advice 
from officials on the quality of the tsar’s work. One critical commentator 
observed that:  
...there appears to be no systematic checks on the quality of outsourced evidential 
reviews.54  
111. Nor has the collective experience of appointing tsars been evaluated in the 
way that, for example, a department’s research programme is commonly 
subject to periodic evaluation to assess its quality, impact and value for 
money; or the way that the performance of an expert advisory body is 
assessed from time to time, most recently in the Coalition’s ‘quango cull’. 
112. Moreover, again unlike the appointment of researchers or consultants or 
engagement with scientific advisory bodies, there is no procedural or 
practice advice in place to guide the work of tsars and their assistants. Nor 
are there cadres of officials who regularly do this kind or work. Nor a senior 
official with oversight of tsar appointments. Most tsars do the job once 
only, supported by officials who are usually without previous experience in 
this kind of work. Our tsar interviewees only occasionally told us of contact 
they had with previous tsars in order to ‘pick their brains’. So, not only is 
there no formal evaluation of tsars’ work individually or collectively to 
inform departmental guidance, there is also no accumulation and 
harvesting of good practice to install within a department’s institutional 
memory. Without evaluation the civil service cannot learn how best to 
manage tsar appointments on behalf of ministers. One senior civil servant 
we interviewed declared: 
 I’m not a fan of evaluating tsars’ contribution, as they are a small feature, there 
are not many of them, they don’t cost much, they work well on the whole.’ 
How do they know? 
                                                                                                                       
exemplar of policy success; Jill Rutter, Edward Marshall and Sam Sims, The ‘S’ factors: 
Lessons from IfG’s policy success reunions, Institute for Government, 2012. Another 
example is an assessment of the report of Graham Badman’s review of home education 
which criticised its methodological and reporting qualities; Bruce Stafford, Bad evidence: 
the curious case of the government-commissioned review of elective home education in 
England and how parents exposed its weaknesses, Evidence and Policy, 8/3, 2012. 
54 Bruce Stafford, op.cit., p 375. 
       





7 How effective are tsars? 
113. The term ‘tsar’ may be disliked because it can give a false impression of 
executive authority. Yet tsars can be hugely powerful: they have the power 
to influence ministers and policies directly and personally. Potentially 
ministers see tsars’ advice as authoritative, informed and trustworthy and it 
comes straight to them, unmediated by others. The actual influence tsars 
have can be charted in terms of their outputs (what they produce as 
advice), the outcomes (how the advice is regarded and treated by the 
minister and parliament) and consequent impacts (in terms of changes in 
policy, practice or the terms of debate). Our research has been able to 
track a sequence of outputs, outcomes and impacts for most of the more 
than 260 tsar appointments over the last 15 years. 
Outputs 
114. Information in the public domain about the results of tsars’ work is plentiful 
in some cases, patchy in some and hidden or absent in others (Table 23). 
In four fifths of the 260 cases (80%) where the tsar’s work was complete 
by mid 2012, the tsar had given the minister a final report with advice or 
recommendations for next steps. Most of these were for reviews, and most 
of them took the form of texts written by the tsar with more or less 
assistance from the civil servants working with them.  
80% 208  Final report 
15% 39 Interim report(s) or briefings only 
5% 13 Not known 
100% 260 Total (completed work) 
Table 23 Tsars’ reporting 
115. How these final reports were published varied greatly:  
 some were published as parliamentary papers, for example Sir Iain 
Glidewell’s review of the Crown Prosecution Service (1998) was Cm.3960; 
 some were published on the department’s website, for example, the many 
reviews commissioned by Treasury ministers;  
 others were published on a bespoke website created specifically for the 
review, for example, Professor Adrian Smith’s review of post-14 maths 
education (2002); 
 yet others were published on the website of the tsar’s home or sponsoring 
institution, for example, the report of Professor John Hills’ review on fuel 
poverty (2011) on LSE’s website; and Jean Gross, the Children’s 
Communications Champion’s report (2010) on the Communications Trust’s 
website.  
116. Some final reports were not published at all. They were confidential reports 
with restricted circulation not released into the public domain, although 
       





sometimes a minister might refer to its existence, as happened with Lord 
Ashcroft’s report on air bases in Cyprus (2011).55  
117. In about a sixth of cases (15%) the tsar produced only an interim report or 
informal briefing(s), which may not have been written documents, and 
there was apparently no final written report. This arrangement may or may 
not have been agreed at the outset. Tsars with remits to represent and 
promote (see paras 77ff) were more likely to produce such interim reports 
or brief the minister in some other way. Tsars with remits to represent and 
promote were more likely to use such informal means to update ministers 
on their emerging findings and recommendations. Tsars who had promote 
remits were also likely to use public communications to put their messages 
out, including making speeches at events, such as Martha Lane Fox (2009) 
on digital media; writing online blogs, such as Baroness Newlove on safer 
communities (2010); and giving media interviews or writing opinion pieces 
for print and online newspapers, such as Dame Joan Bakewell as the Voice 
of Older People (2008). 
118. For a small number of tsars (5%) we could find no evidence of their outputs 
in any of the above forms in the public domain. We submitted Freedom of 
Information requests to six departments to find out more about the reports 
provided by a sample of 12 tsars with represent or promote remits. We 
received full substantive replies concerning only three of these 12 tsars, 
only two of which help to answer the specific question: how did the tsar 
report to the minister (details are in Annex 3.2).The FOI requests regarding 
the other nine tsars were rejected on various grounds. In the two 
substantive answers, one tsar was reported to have had periodic face to 
face meetings with the minister, supplemented by written notes; the other 
wrote a summary report in the form of a letter to the relevant ministers.  
119. In summary, almost all tsars produced reports, though they were not 
always published. For a minority of tsar appointments there is no public 
evidence of what they did.  
Outcomes: ministerial responses 
120. Ministers have responded to tsars’ reports in various ways. Usually there is 
a press notice acknowledging the report. In some cases the minister has 
written a foreword to the published report. In some case the minister has 
made a statement in parliament. Just over 18% of tsar appointments were 
announced to parliament by ministers in statements to both houses; the 
remaining 82% were not announced there (Table 24), although they may 
have been publicised in press statements and on departments’ websites. 
Ministers made statements on receiving a tsar’s report to both houses in 
fewer than half (43%) of the cases (Table 24). Again, there was much 
variability in practice. Ministerial responses were sometimes timed to 
accompany the publication of the report; sometimes they were promised 
for a later stage. Whether the minister responded publicly or later on, the 
response to the tsar’s advice in the report could range from total 
acceptance of all the recommendations with a commitment to a programme 
                                       
55 Phil Hammond, House of Commons Written Statement, Hansard, 15 December 2011, 
col 114WS. 
       





of action to deliver on the advice, to total rejection, via partial acceptance 
or a deferred decision. 
 Yes No 
Appointment announced 18% 82% 
Report announced 43% 57% 
Table 24 Ministerial statements in parliament 
121. Tsars’ advice in published reports was rarely overtly rejected; rather there 
would be no public response. This silence may indicate that the tsar had 
briefed ministers and officials informally or off the record, or that ministers 
were dissatisfied with the tsar’s work and/or recommendations, or whose 
interest in the topic had faded, or where the policy issue had become less 
of a priority; or the minister receiving the report had not commissioned it, 
following reshuffles or a general election. It may not be clear which of these 
explanations apply. Some tsars, facing this non-response, have stated their 
dissatisfaction publicly: 
 Jan Berry, appointed as the Reducing Bureaucracy in Policing Advocate by 
Labour (2008), a post that was not renewed by the Coalition 
administration, told a subsequent select committee inquiry that she had 
never received a formal response to any of her reports.56  
 Frank Field MP, who reviewed poverty and life chances (2010) for the 
Coalition administration, reportedly said that he did not believe the Prime 
Minister has read the paper, and despite ‘some very pleasant meetings’ 
with cabinet ministers about his recommendations ‘nothing has been done 
about it.’57  
Outcomes: parliamentary responses 
122. We traced in Hansard parliamentary references to a randomised sample of 
67 (25%) of the 267 tsars for both the House of Commons and House of 
Lords, including ministerial statements, parliamentary questions, debates, 
early day motions and petitions, and in select committee publications.  
123. Members of both houses (mostly MPs in the Commons) asked questions 
about 83% of the individual tsars. There were up to 10 questions on one 
third (34%) of the tsars and up to 30 questions about nearly two thirds 
(65%) of tsars. A few tsars (13%) attracted more questions and 16% had 
none. Members also sometimes referred to tsars in debates and in one or 
two Early Day Motions (EDMs), where 39% of tsars attracted up to 10 
mentions and almost a fifth (19%) attracted between 51 and 100 mentions 
while more than a fifth (22%) were not mentioned (Table 25). This 
evidences quite a high level of interest among members of both Houses in 
the work of individual tsars. 
 
 PQs Debates, EDMs 
                                       
56 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, New Landscape of Policing, Session 
2010-12, HC 939, 2011, para 251. 
57 Guardian, 24 September 2012. 
       





none 16% 22% 
1-10 34% 39% 
11-30 31% 6% 
31-50 4% 7% 
51-100 12% 19% 
101+ 1% 1% 
Table 25 Parliamentary questions, debates, EDMs 
124. Tsars also had frequent mentions in the publications of select committees 
of the House of Commons (Table 26). Tsars have given oral and written 
evidence to committees either during or after their appointments, and 






Table 26 Select committees’ consideration of tsars’ work 
125. Most of the mentions in the sample concerned matters of substance while 
one was a report of a pre-appointment hearing for a statutory tsar 
appointment. In our sample there were no select committee inquiries 
purely on tsars’ own reports, although in recent years there have been 
inquiries either focused explicitly on a tsar’s report or on a topic on which a 
recent tsar’s report had made a major contribution and formed an 
important part of the evidence before the committee. For example: 
 The report of the Badman review of home education (2009) was examined 
by the Children, Schools and Families Select Committee following public 
opposition to its conclusions; the Committee issued a very critical report.58 
In June 2012 the Committee announced a further inquiry on home 
education. 
 Professor Ian Hargreaves’ review of intellectual property and growth (2010) 
and the government response has been exhaustively considered by the 
Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee, which has published 
three reports on it.59 
 The Education Select Committee announced in July 2011 an inquiry into the 
child protection system after publication in May 2011 of Professor Eileen 
                                       
58 House of Commons, Children, Schools and Families Committee, The review of elective 
home education, Session 2009-10, HC 39, 2009. 
59 The latest with the government’s response is House of Commons, Business Innovation 
and Skills Committee, The Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property: Where next?, 
Session 2012-13, HC 579, 2012. 
       





Munro’s review of child protection (2010) to which the government had 
already responded. 60 
 In March 2012 the Transport Select Committee announced an inquiry into 
Rail 2020 which would take account of, but not be limited to, the report by 
Sir Roy McNulty on improving efficiency in the rail industry (2010) and the 
government’s consequent proposals for reform, fares and decentralisation 
published in March 2012.61 
Individual select committees choose to focus an inquiry on a tsar’s reports 
of their own volition; there is no common procedure that requires them to 
put tsars’ work under their scrutiny.  
Outcomes: actions 
126. Beyond the tsar’s reporting and the government, and possibly 
parliamentary, response to it, accepting the tsar’s advice wholly or in part, 
there may be actual outcomes. Table 27 shows the several kinds of action 
that the 267 tsar appointments have produced. However, the labels should 
be interpreted with caution as they are inevitably imprecise; this is the 
because tsars’ remits vary so much in terms of scope, breadth, depth, and 
because the amount of detail about outcomes in the public domain varies 
enormously. With that caution in mind, and as several actions often apply 
to each case, we can state some overall impressions. 
42% 112  policy change 
38% 103  practice change 
19% 52  new organisational remit 
11% 31 legislation 
10% 28  further government-commissioned inquiry 
7% 18  select committee inquiry 
3% 9  progress report(s) on implementation 
13% 36  other (of which 24 in progress) 
15% 41  not known 
Table 27 Actions arising from tsars’ work  
(total exceeds 100% as several outcomes may apply to each tsar appointment)  
127. In over 40% of tsars’ work a policy change was informed and may have 
been prompted by tsars’ efforts. For example:  
 Philip Hampton’s review of regulation, inspection and enforcement (2004) 
resulted in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. 
 new rates of tuition fees for students were introduced following Lord 
Browne’s review of higher education (2010). 





       





 Professor Alison Wolf’s review of vocational education (2010) resulted in 
curriculum changes, reform of performance tables and funding rules, and a 
commitment to simplify apprenticeships (this latter now the subject of a 
further review).  
128. In just under 40% of cases there was a change in practice prompted 
directly by the tsar’s recommendations. For example:  
 Nigel Shadbolt’s and Tim Berners-Lee’s work as Information Advisors 
(2009) has led to the creation of the www.data.gov.uk website. 
 Sir Michael Pitt’s review of lessons learned from the summer 2007 floods 
(2008) had proposals for the better prediction of, preparation for and 
response to flooding. 
Sir Jim Rose’s report on dyslexia (2009) led to better identification of the 
condition and to new teaching methods.  
129. In nearly a fifth of cases (19%) a tsar’s recommendations have led to a 
new organisation being established or to changes to roles of existing 
bodies. For example: 
 the Office of Government Commerce was created following Peter Gershon’s 
review of procurement (1998); 
 the Money Advice Service was established following Otto Thoresen’s review 
of financial advice (2008); 
 the UK Council for Child Internet Safety was created following Dr Tanya 
Byron’s review of the risks that children face from the internet and video 
games(2007); 
  the regulator OfCom’s responsibilities were altered following Professor 
Martin Cave’s review of spectrum management (2001). 
130. It is however not always the case that a positive government response 
leads to action. The vagaries of ministerial reshuffles, elections, changing 
agendas and shifting priorities, may stall action. Not all the promised 
actions have come to fruition. Our judgement though is that the advice of a 
majority of tsars has some impact.  
Impacts 
131. What difference have tsars made? The findings of our research show that a 
significant proportion of tsar appointments seem to make a difference to 
policy and/or practice and/or the terms of public debate. The degree of 
influence a tsar can have is often helped in one or more of four 
circumstances: 
 if the tsar’s appointment or reporting is timed to support already planned 
legislative or budgetary action or a stated government priority; 
 if the tsar’s work is based on sound expertise, producing compelling advice 
based on rigorous analysis and argument; 
 if the tsar’s recommendations are politically acceptable to the minister; 
 if the tsar has built a community of active support within and/or outside 
government that will keep the momentum for change going. 
       





132. Where the expertise that tsars draw on is close to their main professional or 
analytical activities, the tsars have a stronger chance of seeing their 
recommendations accepted and acted on, provided the minister is 
committed to the issue and judges the political timing and context to be 
favourable. Delayed or lukewarm responses can be an indication of loss of 
salience of that issue, or loss of the attention of the tsar’s ministerial 
patron. 
133. We identify three types of impact of a tsar’s work on policy development.  
 First, it can offer a solution for a pressing problem that a minister wants to 
solve, for example, Professor Alison Wolf on vocational education or Sir 
Scott Baker QC on extradition laws. That is what most tsars are appointed 
to do, thus operating rather like consultants or professional advisors.  
 Second, the work can be an exercise in reframing what may be a 
contested and long-running policy issue, such as Lord Sandy Leitch’s work 
on skills, Adair Turner’s on pensions or more recently Andrew Dilnot’s on 
social care. Here the tsar can offer a refreshed and potentially more 
consensual basis for reform, which may take time to be realised. Such tsars 
may be seen as a substitute for the traditional committee of inquiry.  
 Third, and perhaps not often intentionally, the work of a tsar may result in 
no specifically attributable actions, yet it will strongly inform the terms of 
subsequent policy debate over time, such as Sir Michael Lyons’ work on 
local government finance or Sir Nicholas Stern’s review of the economics of 
climate change. Such work is somewhat akin to commissioned research. 
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Annex 1.1 Tsars 1997-201262  
LABOUR 1997-2001 
Prof Sir Jack Beatson Review of bailiff law Lord Irvine MOJ 
Ted Cantle Chair, Review of community cohesion after race riots David Blunkett HO 
David Carson Chair, Review of GP after hours care John Denham DH 
Louise Casey Head of Rough Sleepers Unit Tony Blair CO 
Don Cruikshank Review of UK banking services Gordon Brown HMT 
Sir John Egan Chair, construction taskforce John Prescott DCLG 
Peter Gershon Review of civil procurement in central government Geoffrey Robinson HMT 
Sir Iain Glidewell Review of the Crown Prosecution Service Jack Straw MOJ 
Keith Hellawell*  UK Anti-drugs coordinator Ann Taylor CO 
DeAnne Julius Chair, Review of banking service consumer codes Gordon Brown HMT 
Jim Rose Scrutiny of national assessment tests for primary schools David Blunkett DfE 
Lord Sharman Review of audit and accountability of central government Alastair Darling HMT 
Prof Sir Leslie Turnberg Chair, Review of London's health services Frank Dobson DH 
Derek Wanless Review of long term resource needs for health Gordon Brown HMT 
 
LABOUR 2001-2005 
   
Christopher Allsopp Review of statistics for economic policy making Gordon Brown HMT 
Iain Anderson Chair, Review of government response to foot and mouth 2001  Margaret Beckett DEFRA 
                                       
62 * Appointment renewed by next government. The list uses most recent forms of departments’ names.  
Please note: we are sure that this list is incomplete and has omissions where we have not yet identified appointments. 
       





Prof George Bain Chair, Review of the fire service John Prescott DCLG 
Kate Barker Review of housing supply Gordon Brown HMT 
Stephen Boys Smith Review of Coal Health Compensation Scheme Malcolm Wicks BIS 
Mr Justice Butterfield Review of criminal investigations and prosecutions conducted by HM 
Customs and Excise 
John Healy; Lord Goldsmith HMT; AG 
Lord Carter Review of offender management David Blunkett HO 
Lord Carter Review of the Criminal Records Bureau David Blunkett HO 
Lord Carter Review of public diplomacy  Jack Straw FCO; HMT 
Prof Martin Cave Audit of spectrum holdings Gordon Brown HMT 
Prof Martin Cave Independent review of radio spectrum management Gordon Brown; Patricia Hewitt HMT; BIS 
Prince Charles NHS hospital design champion Alan Milburn DH 
Sir David Clementi Review of the regulation of legal services Lord Falconer MOJ 
Ann Clwyd MP UK Special envoy on human rights in Iraq Tony Blair  PM 
Sir Brian Fall Special representative for South Caucasus Jack Straw FCO 
Sir Andrew Foster Review of the future role of FE colleges Charles Clarke DfE 
Peter Gershon* Review of royal and ministerial air travel David Miliband CO 
Sir Nicholas Goodison Review of support to museums Paul Boateng HMT 
Teresa Graham Review of Small Firms Loan Guarantee Patricia Hewitt BIS 
Philip Hampton Review of regulatory inspection and enforcement Gordon Brown HMT 
Lord Haskins Review of rural delivery Margaret Beckett DEFRA 
Lord Haskins Rural recovery co-ordinator Tony Blair DEFRA 
Derek Higgs Chair, Review of role and effectiveness of NEDs Patricia Hewitt; Gordon Brown BIS; HMT 
Richard Lambert Review of business-university collaboration Gordon Brown HMT 
Sandy Leitch Review of UK's long term skill needs Gordon Brown; Charles Clarke HMT; DfE 
Sir Michael Lyons Review of public sector relocation Gordon Brown; John Prescott HMT; DCLG 
       





Sir Michael Lyons* Head of inquiry into local government Gordon Brown; John Prescott; 
 Ruth Kelly 
HMT; DCLG 
Prof David Miles Review of the fixed rate mortgage market Gordon Brown HMT 
Sir Derek Morris Review into the actuarial profession Ruth Kelly HMT 
Sir Paul Myners Review of institutional investment Gordon Brown HMT 
Sir Paul Myners Review of corporate governance of mutual life offices Ruth Kelly HMT 
Lord Penrose Inquiry into Equitable Life Assurance Society Ruth Kelly HMT 
Alan Pickering Review of private sector pensions Alastair Darling DWP 
Sir Gareth Roberts Review of science and engineering skills in the UK Gordon Brown BIS 
Ron Sandler Review of long term retail savings Gordon Brown HMT 
Prof Steven Schwartz Chair, Review of HE admissions Charles Clarke DfE 
Prof Adrian Smith Chair of inquiry into post 14 maths education Charles Clarke DfE 
Prof Adrian Smith Chair, Review of crime statistics Charles Clarke HO 
Mike Tomlinson Inquiry into A level standards Estelle Morris DfE 
Adair Turner Chair, Pensions Commission Tony Blair DWP 
Derek Wanless Review of securing good health for the whole nation Gordon Brown; John Reid HMT; DH 
Sir John Wheeler Review on airport security Alastair Darling; David Blunkett DTP; HO 
Brian Wilson MP PM's Special representative on overseas trade and Iraq reconstruction Tony Blair PM 
Alan Wood Review of European public procurement Gordon Brown HMT; BIS 
 
LABOUR 2005-2010 
   
Rod Aldridge Chair, Dance Champions Group Andy Burnham DH 
Iain Anderson Chair, Review of 2007 foot and mouth disease response Hilary Benn PM; DEFRA 
John Ashton Special representative for climate change Margaret Beckett FCO 
Maggie Atkinson  Children's Commissioner Ed Balls DfE 
       





Sir Al Aynsley-Green Children's Commissioner Ruth Kelly DfE 
Graham Badman Review of elective home education Ed Balls DfE 
Dame Joan Bakewell Voice of older people Harriet Harman CO 
Prof Sube Banerjee Review of the use of anti-psychotic drugs for dementia Phil Hope DH 
Christopher Banks Review of fees and co-funding in further education in England Peter Mandelson BIS 
Kate Barker Review of the land use planning system in England Gordon Brown; John Prescott HMT; DCLG 
John Bercow MP Review of services for children and young people with  
speech, language and communication needs 
Alan Johnson; Ed Balls DH; DfE 
Tim Berners-Lee Government internet advisor Gordon Brown CO 
Jan Berry Reducing bureaucracy in policing advocate  Jacqui Smith HO 
Dame Carol Black Review of the health of the working age population Andy Burnham; James Purnell DH; DWP 
Steve Boorman Chair, Review of NHS Health and Well-being Andy Burnham DH 
Lord Boyce Chair, Review of the armed forces compensation scheme Bob Ainsworth MOD 
Stephen Boys Smith Review of airport policing Alastair Darling; Charles Clarke DTP; HO 
Stephen Boys Smith Review of personnel security in transport Ruth Kelly DTP 
Stephen Boys Smith Review of Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre Jacqui Smith HO 
Lord Bradley Review of people with mental health problems in the criminal justice 
system 
Jack Straw MOJ 
Des Browne MP Special envoy to Sri Lanka Gordon Brown FCO 
Lord Browne Chair, Review of higher education funding and student finance Peter Mandelson BIS 
Prof Tanya Byron Review the risks that children face from the internet and video games Ed Balls; Andy Burnham DfE; DCMS 
Richard Caborn MP Ambassador for 2018 World Cup bid Gordon Brown DCMS 
Francesco Caio Chair, Review of barriers to investment in next generation access  Shriti Vadera BIS 
Lord Carter Review of legal aid procurement Lord Falconer MOJ 
Lord Carter Review of NHS pathology services 2006-08 Lord Warner DH  
Prof Martin Cave Review of competition in water markets Alastair Darling; Hilary Benn HMT; DEFRA 
       





Prof Martin Cave Review of social housing regulation Ruth Kelly DCLG 
Prof Martin Cave Chair, Review of airport regulation Ruth Kelly DTP 
Sir John Chadwick Advisor in relation to The Equitable Life ex-gratia compensation scheme Stephen Timms HMT 
Michael Clapham* Chair, Review of coalfields regeneration John Healy DCLG 
Sir David Cooksey Review of the public funding of health research Patricia Hewitt; Alan Johnson DH; BIS 
Baroness Corston Review of vulnerable women in the criminal justice system Lady Scotland MOJ 
Sir George Cox Review of creativity in UK business Gordon Brown HMT 
Sir James Crosby Chair, public-private forum on identity management Gordon Brown HMT 
Lord Davidson QC Review of UK implementation of EU regulations Gordon Brown HMT 
Prof Paul Davies QC Review of statutory regime for issuer liability Ed Balls HMT 
Prof Sir Gordon Duff* Review of the organ donor register Andy Burnham DH 
Sir Rod Eddington Review of long-term links between transport and the UK’s economic 
productivity 
Gordon Brown; Douglas Alexander HMT; DTP 
John Elbourne Review of older people's engagement with government Mike O'Brien DWP 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan Review of policing Jacqui Smith HO 
Michael Foot Review of British offshore financial centres Alastair Darling HMT 
Sir Andrew Foster* Review of InterCity Express programme Lord Adonis DTP 
Sir Andrew Foster Review of the management of the further education capital programme John Denham BIS 
Martha Lane Fox* UK digital champion Gordon Brown; David Cameron BIS; CO 
David Freud Review of Welfare to Work system  James Purnell DWP 
Barry Gardiner MP Special representative on forestry Gordon Brown PM 
Michael Gibbons Review of employment dispute resolution Alastair Darling BIS 
Mark Gibson Chair, Review of UK construction industry productivity Peter Mandelson BIS 
Prof Ian Gilmore Chair, Review of prescription charge exemptions for people with long 
term conditions 
Alan Johnson DH 
Howard Goodall National ambassador for singing Alan Johnson DfE 
       





Andrew Gowers Review into intellectual property rights Gordon Brown HMT 
Prof Paul Gregg Review of the benefit rules James Purnell DWP 
Gerry Grimstone Review of the use of civilians in defence Ainsworth, Bob MOD 
Jean Gross Communications champion for children and young people with  
speech, language and communication needs 
Ed Balls DfE 
Sir Peter Hall and  
Chris Green 
Station champions Lord Adonis DTP 
Tony Hall Review of youth dance and dance education Lord Adonis DfE 
Richard Handover Review of school financial management Ed Balls DfE 
Hermann Hauser Review of Technology and Innovation Centres in the UK Peter Mandelson BIS 
Prof John Hills Chair, National Equality Panel Harriet Harman CO 
Prof John Hills Review of social housing Ruth Kelly DCLG 
Dame Deirdre Hine* Review of UK swine flu pandemic 2009 Andy Burnham CO 
Richard Hooper Review of UK postal services sector John Hutton BIS 
Digby Jones Skills envoy Gordon Brown HMT 
Prof Julia King Review of low carbon vehicle technologies Gordon Brown HMT 
Prof John Lawton Chair, Review of England's wildlife sites Hilary Benn DEFRA 
Mark Lazarowicz MP PM's Special representative on carbon trading Ed Miliband DECC 
Lord Lester Adviser on aspects of constitutional reform Jack Straw MoJ 
Chris Lewin and Ed Sweeney Review of deregulation of private pensions John Hutton DWP 
Prof Richard Macrory Review of regulatory sanctions and penalties John Hutton CO 
Sir Ian Magee* Review of legal aid delivery and governance Lord Bach MOJ 
Sir Ian Magee Chair, Review of criminality information Jacqui Smith HO 
Sunita Mason* Advisor on criminality information management Jacqui Smith; Theresa May HO 
Jack McConnell MSP PM’s Special representative for conflict resolution mechanisms Gordon Brown FCO 
Anne McGuire MP Adviser on third sector innovation Gordon Brown CO 
       





Wayne MacGregor Youth dance champion Margaret Hodge DCMS 
David McLeod and  
Nita Clarke 
Review of employee engagement Peter Mandelson BIS 
Sir Roy McNulty Chair, rail value for money study Lord Adonis DTP 
Alan Milburn MP* Chair, Review panel on access into the professions Gordon Brown CO 
Elliot Morley MP Special representative for Gleneagles climate change dialogue David Miliband DECC 
Baroness Estelle Morris Review of ICT user skills John Denham BIS 
Prof Anne Murcott Chair, Review of controls on infant formula and follow-on formula Dawn Primarolo DH 
Rabbi Julia Neuberger Prime Minister’s Volunteering champion Gordon Brown CO 
Mike Nichols Review of the Highway Agency's major roads programme Douglas Alexander DTP 
David Norgrove Chair, family justice system review panel Jack Straw; Ed Balls MoJ; DfE 
Sir Peter North Review of drink and drug driving law Lord Adonis DTP 
Sir David Omand* Review of the ACMD Alan Johnson HO 
Sir Michael Parkinson Ambassador for dignity in care Ivan Lewis DH 
Sara Payne Victims’ champion Jack Straw MoJ 
Adrian Penfold Review of non-planning consents Ian Lucas BIS 
Sir Joseph Pilling* Identity Commissioner Alan Johnson HO 
Sir Joseph Pilling Review of strategic regulation of the civil aviation authority Ruth Kelly DTP 
Sir Michael Pitt Review of lessons learned from the summer 2007 floods Hilary Benn DEFRA 
Brian Pomeroy Review of Christmas savings schemes Ed Balls HMT 
Kieran Poynter Review of loss of child benefit data Alastair Darling HMT 
David Quarmby* Review of the resilience of England's transport systems in winter 2009-
10 
Lord Adonis DTP 
Sir Steve Redgrave 2012 Sports legacy champion Tessa Jowell DCMS 
Sir Jim Rose Review of the national primary curriculum Ed Balls DfE 
Sir Jim Rose Review of identifying and teaching children and young people with Ed Balls DfE 
       






Sir Jim Rose Review of the teaching of early reading Ruth Kelly DfE 
Julie Rugg and  
David Rhodes 
Review of the private rented sector Ian Wright DCLG 
Lord Sainsbury Review of science and innovation policies Gordon Brown HMT 
Finlay Scott* Chair, Review of healthcare professionals registration  Alan Johnson DH 
Nigel Shadbolt Information Adviser Gordon Brown CO 
Dame Stephanie Shirley Government’s Giving and philanthropy ambassador Gordon Brown CO 
Peter Smallridge and  
Andrew Williamson 
Review of the use of restraint in juvenile secure settings David Hanson; Beverley Hughes MOJ; DfE 
Peter Smallridge and  
Andrew Williamson  
Monitor implementation of changes arising from the review of restraint David Hanson; Beverley Hughes MOJ; DfE 
Ian R Smith Review the scope for further government relocations Alastair Darling HMT 
John Stannard National Champion for the Young, Gifted and Talented Programme Lord Adonis DfE 
Prof Jimmy Steele Review of NHS dental services Alan Johnson DH 
Sir Alan Steer Review of pupil behaviour in schools Ed Balls DfE 
Sir Nicholas Stern Adviser on the economics of climate change and development Gordon Brown HMT 
Lord Stevens PM's international security adviser Gordon Brown CO 
Lord Alan Sugar Government Enterprise champion Gordon Brown BIS 
Richard Taylor Special envoy on tackling youth violence and knife crime Gordon Brown PM 
Richard Thomas and  
Mark Walport 
Review of data sharing  Gordon Brown MOJ 
Otto Thoresen Review of generic financial advice Ed Balls HMT 
Paul Thornton Review of pensions institutions John Hutton DWP 
Prof Sir John Tooke Chair, Review of postgraduate medical training Patricia Hewitt DH 
Sir David Varney Adviser on public service transformation Gordon Brown HMT 
       





Sir David Varney Review of tax policy in Northern Ireland Gordon Brown HMT 
Sir David Varney Review of competitiveness of Northern Ireland  Alastair Darling HMT 
Anna Walker Chair, Review of charging and metering for water and sewerage 
services 
Hilary Benn DEFRA 
Sir David Walker Review of corporate governance in in the UK banking industry  Alastair Darling HMT 
Imelda Walsh Review of the right to request flexible working John Hutton BIS 
Malcolm Wicks MP PM's Special representative on international energy  Ed Miliband DECC 
Baroness Williams PM’s Advisor on nuclear proliferation Gordon Brown PM 
 
COALITION 2010-July 2012 
  
Graham Aaronson QC  Review of a General Anti-Avoidance Rule  David Gauke HMT 
Graham Allen MP Review of early intervention David Cameron PM 
Lord Ashcroft Review of military bases on Cyprus David Cameron MOD 
Lord Ashdown Chair, Review of humanitarian response Andrew Mitchell DfID 
Reg Bailey Review of the commercialisation and sexualisation of childhood Sarah Teather DfE 
Shaun Bailey Big Society Ambassador David Cameron CO 
Sir Scott Baker Review of UK’s extradition laws Theresa May HO 
Adrian Beecroft Review of employment law David Cameron PM 
Lord Bew Review of Key Stage 2 testing and accountability Michael Gove DfE 
Dame Carol Black and  
David Frost 
Review of the sickness absence system Lord Freud; Ed Davey DWP; BIS 
Tim Breedon Chair, non-bank lending taskforce Vince Cable BIS 
Lord Browne Government’s Lead non-executive director Francis Maude CO 
Sir Andrew Burns UK Envoy for post-Holocaust issues William Hague FCO 
Sally Coates Chair, Review of teachers' standards Michael Gove DfE 
Sir Ronald Cohen and  Advisors on a Big Society Bank Francis Maude CO 
       






Alan Cook Review of the strategic road network Phil Hammond DTP 
Lord Currie Review of single source pricing regulations Peter Luff MOD 
Lord Davies Chair, Review of women on boards Vince Cable; Theresa May BIS 
Andrew Dilnot Chair, Commission on the funding of care and support Andrew Lansley DH 
Henry Dimbleby and  
John Vincent 
Review of food in schools Michael Gove DfE 
John Dunford Review of the Office of the Children's Commissioner (England) Michael Gove DfE 
Frank Field MP Review of poverty and life chances David Cameron CO 
Sir Philip Green Review of efficiency of government spending Francis Maude; Danny Alexander CO; HMT 
Robin Gwynn Special representative for Sudan and South Sudan William Hague FCO; DfID 
Prof Ian Hargreaves Review of intellectual property and growth David Cameron BIS 
Prof Malcolm Harrington Review of Work Capability Assessment Iain Duncan Smith DWP 
Emma Harrison Troubled families champion David Cameron PM 
Darren Henley Review of music education Michael Gove DfE; DCMS 
Darren Henley Review of cultural education Ed Vaizey DCMS; DfE 
Lord Heseltine and  
Sir Terry Leahy 
Review of Liverpool City region David Cameron PM; BIS 
Lord Heseltine Review of private-public sector collaboration George Osborne; Vince Cable HMT; BIS 
Prof John Hills Review of fuel poverty policy target and definition Chris Huhne DECC 
Lord Hodgson Review of the Charities Act 2006 Francis Maude CO 
Sir John Holmes Review of the awarding of military medals David Cameron PM; MOD 
Richard Hooper Feasibility study into the Digital Copyright Exchange Vince Cable BIS 
Simon Hughes MP Advocate for access to post-16 education David Cameron PM 
Tom Hughes-Hallett Chair, Review of palliative care Andrew Lansley DH 
Lord Hutton Chair of public service pensions commission George Osborne HMT 
       





Will Hutton Review of fair pay in the public sector David Cameron PM 
Sebastian James Chair, Review of school capital system Michael Gove DfE 
Paul Johnson Chair, Review of automatic enrolment in pension schemes Steve Webb DWP 
Prof John Kay Review of UK equity markets Vince Cable BIS 
Charlotte Leslie MP Big Society Ambassador David Cameron PM 
Lord Levene Chair, Review of the structure and management of the MOD Liam Fox MOD 
Lord Lingfield Chair, Review of professionalism in further education John Hayes BIS 
Prof Ragnar Lofstedt Review of health and safety legislation Chris Grayling DWP 
Prof Geoffrey Maitland Chair, Review of oil and gas exploration safety Chris Huhne DECC 
Frank McLoughlin Chair, Commission on adult vocational learning John Hayes BIS 
Alan Milburn Review on social mobility Nick Clegg CO 
Sir Adrian Montague Chair, Review of the potential for institutional investment in the private 
rented sector 
Grant Shapps DCLG 
Prof Eileen Munro Review of child protection Michael Gove DfE 
Andrew Murrison MP Review of services for military amputees Simon Burns DH 
Andrew Murrison MP Review of mental health care provision for former service personnel David Cameron MOD 
Andrew Murrison MP PM’s Special representative for the Centenary Commemoration of WWI David Cameron PM 
Martin Narey Ministerial adviser on adoption Tim Loughton DfE 
Baroness Pauline Neville 
Jones 
Special representative to business on cybersecurity David Cameron PM 
Baroness Newlove Champion for active, safer communities Theresa May HO 
Peter Neyroud Review of police leadership and training Theresa May HO 
Prof Cathy Nutbrown Review of early education and childcare qualifications Sarah Teather DfE 
Graeme Nuttall Review of employee ownership Norman Lamb BIS 
Tim Oates Chair, National Curriculum review panel Michael Gove DfE 
Lord Patten PM's Special representative for the Papal visit to Britain David Cameron FCO 
       





Mary Portas Review into the future of the high street David Cameron; Nick Clegg BIS 
Mike Potter Chair, Review panel for government support for maritime training Mike Penning DTP 
David Quarmby Audit of the resilience of England's transport systems in winter 2010 Phil Hammond DTP 
Liz Sayce Review of disability employment support Iain Duncan Smith DWP 
Mark Sedwill Special representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan William Hague FCO  
Carol Serjeant Chair, Simple financial products steering group Mark Hoban HMT 
Elizabeth Sidwell Schools Commissioner for England Michael Gove DfE 
Lord Chris Smith Review of the British film industry Ed Vaizey DCMS 
Prof Hew Strachan Review of military covenant David Cameron MOD 
Charlie Taylor Expert advisor on school behaviour Michael Gove DfE 
Dame Clare Tickell Chair, Review of early years foundation stage Sarah Teather DfE 
Sir John Vickers Chair of independent commission on banking George Osborne HMT 
Lord Wasserman Policing IT adviser Theresa May HO 
Lord Wei Big Society Ambassador David Cameron CO 
Sir Tim Wilson Chair, Review of business-university collaborations Vince Cable; David Willetts BIS 
Tom Winsor Review of police pay and conditions Theresa May HO 
Prof Alison Wolf Review of vocational education Michael Gove DfE 
Lord Young Advisor on health and safety law and practice David Cameron PM 
Lord Young  PM's enterprise advisor David Cameron PM 
 
       
















Sir Michael Lyons 
Sir Ian Magee  
Alan Milburn 
Sir Paul Myners 
Sir Joseph Pilling 
David Quarmby 
Peter Smallridge and Andrew Williamson 





Sir Andrew Foster 
Professor John Hills 
Andrew Murrison MP 
Sir David Varney 
 
Four appointments 
Stephen Boys Smith 
Sir Jim Rose 
 
Five appointments 
Lord Carter of Coles 
Professor Martin Cave 
       






Annex 1.3 Tsar pairs 
Dame Carol Black / David Frost  
Sir Ronald Cohen / Nick O'Donohoe  
Henry Dimbleby / John Vincent  
Sir Peter Hall / Chris Green  
Lord Heseltine / Sir Terry Leahy  
Chris Lewin / Ed Sweeney (x2) 
David Mcleod /Nita Clarke  
Julie Rugg / David Rhodes  











       






















Annex 2.2 Full profile 
 
TSAR PROFILE Researcher initials: Date:  Hours: 
Name of Tsar   
Official title of role  
Official remit  
Type of remit  
Scope  
Start and end dates  
Client department  
How selected  
Solo or team  
Professional background   




Working methods  
Reporting  






Ethnic background  
       






Annex 3.1 Freedom of Information requests: payment 
We submitted Freedom of Information requests to 12 departments to find out 
more details about payments for 32 tsar appointments. The requests explored 
the evidence concerning a range of ministers, remits and tsar expertise.  
We received substantive replies for 30 (94%) of the requests and await the 
remaining two (6%), from the Home Office, concerning Jan Berry and Baroness 
Newlove, even though the officially allowed extended time limit of 40 working 
days has long passed.  
Omitting those missing replies from the analysis, 10 (33%) of the 30 replies 
were refusals to disclose any of the requested information, citing various 
reasons; these came from the Cabinet Office (three of its own ministers’ 
appointments and three appointed by the Prime Minister), HMT (2) and DfE (1). 
We interviewed one of the tsars appointed by the Cabinet Office, who disclosed 
the payments and other budget information, which we have included for Table 
28. 
Some departments sent part replies, which concern seven (23%) appointments; 
these were DfE (3), DTP (1), DWP (1) and MOD (1). Full replies were provided 
for 13 (43%) appointments, by BIS (3), DCMS (1), DECC (1), DH (2), FCO (1) 
and HMT (5). 
 No.  % 
No disclosure  10 33 
Partial disclosure  7 23 
Full disclosure  13 43 
Table 28 FOI replies: payments to tsars 
The replies that did disclose part or full information show that eight of the 17 
(47%) of tsars received payment of fees and nine (53%) received expenses; 
three  (18%) of the 17 received expenses only (Table 29). 
 Paid (%) Not paid (%) 
Fees 8 (47) 9 (53) 
Expenses 9 (53) 8 (47) 
Fees and expenses 6 (35) - 
Expenses only 3 (18) - 
No fees or expenses 8 (47)  
Table 29 Fees and expenses payments to tsars 
We asked departments to explain how they set fee rates for these tsars. The 
majority did not answer this question. Three possibilities were revealed: either 
the tsar’s usual salary plus overheads for their main employment, or the level of 





       





Annex 3.2 Freedom of Information requests: reporting 
We submitted Freedom of Information requests to six departments to find out 
more about the reporting provided by twelve tsars with represent or promote 
remits. They all had titles as champions or advisors or envoys or representatives 
and we had found no reports from them in the public domain. 
Half of the requests, concerning six tsars, were rejected by the Cabinet Office; 
these included three appointments (Tim Berners-Lee, Lord Stevens and Ann 
McGuire MP) made by its own ministers’ and three made by the Prime Minister 
(Emma Harrison, Richard Taylor and Baroness Williams). We had submitted each 
request separately; the Cabinet Office chose to aggregate them, and then said 
that it would cost too much to provide a single answer. 
Two further requests, both to DCMS, had not been answered after more than 
three months had elapsed. DCMS notified us of delay after each month had 
passed, saying that the department was still considering each request. 
Responses to requests are meant to be made within 20 working days, although 
an extended time limit, to 40 working days, can sometimes be allowed. That has 
long passed too. Our four other requests went to four departments: BIS, DfE, 
DH and FCO. BIS and DH gave full replies, DfE and FCO gave limited replies 
(Table 30).  
6 50% reply refused 
2 17% full reply 
2 17% part reply 
2 17% delay 
Table 30 FOI replies: reporting by tsars 
The BIS tsar was Lord Alan Sugar, active as Enterprise Champion for about nine 
months in 2009-10. He held many meetings with businesses and within BIS, 
gave talks, attended events, gave press interviews and recorded a set of short 
videos. He was supported by civil servants in the Enterprise Division of BIS. He 
reported on his activities and made suggestions for change through occasional 
face to face meetings with and some brief written notes to the Minister for Small 
Business, who was Baroness Vadera and then Lord Mervyn Davies.  
Prince Charles was the DH tsar, appointed NHS Design Champion in 2001, to: 
...mobilis[e] the resources of [...] The Prince’s Foundation, in partnership with NHS 
Estates [...] to raise awareness of the importance of good design for healthcare 
facilities and to assist in the development of design visions for a number of pilot 
projects. 
The DH reply gave no information on Prince Charles’ own reporting to the 
Secretary of State for Health, so it is not possible to say whether he did report at 
all and if so in what ways. The Prince’s Foundation (“...an educational charity 
which exists to improve the quality of people’s lives by teaching and practising 
timeless and ecological ways of planning, designing and building”) had been 
developing a design methodology (Enquiry by Design) since 1999 in new 
housing and regeneration projects. The arrangement with the DH involved 
piloting the application of this methodology to new NHS hospital building. The 
Foundation and DH collaborated on three pilots between 2003 and 2006, and DH 
       





subsequently published a design briefing for hospitals in 2008, authored by the 
Foundation, arising from the pilots.  
The DfE tsar was John Stannard, National Champion for the Young, Gifted and 
Talented programme between 2007 and 2010. The DfE said it had to limit its 
reply on grounds of cost. It provided a terse one page list of bullet points 
(presumably prepared by DfE) dated 2010 on John Stannard’s activities, 
containing numerous untranslated abbreviations of the organisations he dealt 
with. It said nothing about whether, and if so how, he reported to ministers. 
The FCO tsar was Jack McConnell MSP, the Prime Minister’s Special 
Representative for conflict resolution mechanisms between 2008 and 2010. He 
reported to three secretaries of state: at FCO, MOD and DfID, but the reply does 
not say how or how often. The reply does include letter one letter from Jack 
McConnell to the Prime Minister in 2009 describing and commenting on his 
activities to date, which he also sent to the three secretaries of state. 
       





Annex 4 Interviewees 
Lord Andrew Adonis ex-minister 
Graham Allen MP Tsar 
Dame Joan Bakewell Tsar 
Ed Balls MP ex-minister 
Dr Andrew Blick King’s College London 
Faith Boardman Public Management and Policy Association 
Stephen Boys Smith Tsar 
Sally Burlington ex-ODPM 
Prof Mike Campbell Sector Skills Development Agency 
Prof Martin Cave Tsar 
Emily Commander 
House of Commons, Public Administration 
Select Committee 
Roberta d’Eustachio Foundation for Philanthropy 
Prof Richard Disney University of Nottingham 
Martin Donnelly Department for Business, Industry and Skills 
Dr Ruth Fox Hansard Society 
Sue Gray Cabinet Office 
Gerry Grimstone Tsar 
Jean Gross Tsar 
Richard Handover Tsar 
David Hare Whitehouse Consulting 
Prof John Hills Tsar 
Ruth Kelly ex-minister 
Sue Lewis ex-Treasury 
Sir Michael Lyons Tsar 
Sir David Normington Commissioner for Public Appointments  
Sir Peter North Tsar 
Dr Ed Page London School of Economics 
Sally Pugh Cabinet Office 
Nick Raynsford MP House of Commons 
Peter Riddell Institute for Government 
Jill Rutter Institute for Government 
Dame Stephanie Shirley Tsar 
Prof Sir Adrian Smith Tsar 
       





Emma Soames Age UK 
Dr Jack Stilgoe University of Exeter 
Otto Thoresen Tsar 
Simon Webb ex-Department for Transport 
Malcolm Wicks MP ex-minister and Tsar 
Tom Winsor Tsar 
Prof Alison Wolf Tsar 
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